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ABSTRACT
THE ROLE OF ACCURACY IN CHILDREN’S JUDGMENTS OF EXPERTS’
KNOWLEDGE

Allison J. Williams
March, 25, 2022
Children prefer to trust people with expertise and people who are accurate.
Because experts make mistakes and give incorrect information (e.g., predictions and
diagnoses), this dissertation explores children’s judgments of knowledge for experts who
provide inaccurate information. Across two studies, 6- to 9-years-olds (N = 160) were
introduced to two experts in different domains (doctor and mechanic) and rated how
much each expert knows about their relevant domain. Then, over four consecutive trials,
participants heard one expert give inaccurate answers to easy questions in their domain.
After each trial, children explained why they believed the expert gave inaccurate answers
and rated both experts’ level of knowledge. Finally, children chose which expert knew
more about the two relevant domains of expertise. Study 2 included an additional
measure of how children rely on accuracy and expertise when given a task that required
expertise (i.e., assigning questions to be answered by the experts or themselves about
bodies and cars).
Across both studies, children decreased their knowledge ratings for the inaccurate
expert as they heard more inaccurate answers. In Study 1, children’s explanations
predicted their knowledge ratings, such that children who described the expert as having
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a negative trait (e.g., not being smart) gave lower knowledge ratings and children who
endorsed the expert’s inaccurate statements gave higher knowledge ratings. In the
additional question delegation measure in Study 2, children assigned relevant questions in
the inaccurate expert’s domain to the inaccurate expert and relevant questions in the
control expert’s domain to the control expert, and rarely assigned questions to
themselves. When justifying why they delegated questions to the inaccurate expert,
children referred to the inaccurate expert’s relevant expertise. Also, they indicated that
the other expert and/or they did not have relevant knowledge.
Together, these studies demonstrate that children weigh accuracy and expertise
differently depending on the task at hand. They also provide evidence for individual
differences in whether children prioritize an informant’s accuracy or expertise. These
findings suggest that caregivers should discuss circumstances where experts could be
inaccurate and encourage children to listen and think critically about the answers people
provide.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Experts are individuals who have specialized knowledge or mastery in a particular
domain or task. However, that does not make them all knowing, and sometimes they
make mistakes. In the United States, doctors misdiagnose about 5% of their cases each
year when treating adults for outpatient care (Singh et al., 2014). When political experts
were asked to make hundreds of predictions for future political outcomes, the experts
made predictions above chance, however, they were not 100% accurate (Tetlock, 2006).
Also, when expert gamers were asked to recall features of new gaming consoles, the
experts did not accurately recall all of the features (Mehta et al., 2011). Although many
research studies have investigated children’s understanding of expertise (as will be
discussed below), none have investigated children’s judgments of an expert’s knowledge
once the expert provides inaccurate information. The studies in this dissertation will
address this gap in the literature and investigate potential developmental differences in
children’s judgments and reasoning across early elementary school.
By 3-years-old, children show an understanding of expertise when seeking out
information, and this understanding increases with age. In Lutz and Keil’s (2002) study,
3- to 5-year-olds were introduced to two experts (i.e., a doctor and a car mechanic) and
asked questions about who would know more about a specific topic. The questions were
separated into three categories: 1) stereotypical roles (i.e., knowledge that a person can
observe a doctor or car mechanic using), 2) normal functioning (i.e., knowledge referring
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to the domain of expertise, such as a doctor knowing about people’s bodies) and 3)
underlying principles (i.e., knowledge of scientific principles that are involved within
each domain of expertise, such as a doctor knowing about other living kinds beyond just
people). Three-year-old children were able to correctly match the expert to questions
about stereotypical roles more often than chance. However, it was not until 4-years-old
that children also began to correctly match the expert with questions about normal
functioning and underlying principles, and not until 5-years-old that children correctly
matched the expert with questions about normal functioning and underlying principles.
These findings suggests that children’s ability to match an expert with questions about
the expert’s domain of knowledge improves with age.
Further research has also demonstrated that, by 4-years-old, children begin to
show an understanding of the structure of domain-specific knowledge that underlies
expertise. In a study with 4- and 5-year-olds, children were introduced to three experts
(i.e., doctor, firefighter, and farmer) and were asked which expert could answer questions
involving three corresponding domains (i.e., medicine, firefighting, and farming; Aguiar
et al., 2012). Four-year-olds selected the expert more often than chance for each domain.
However, 5-year-olds were significantly better than the younger participants, suggesting
that as children get older, they are better able to understand that experts have knowledge
involving specific topics relevant to their domain.
Not only do children match experts with their specific domains of knowledge, but
they also trust experts when seeking and endorsing information (Koenig & Jaswal, 2011;
Kushnir et al., 2013; Nguyen, 2012; Sobel & Corriveau, 2010). In the epistemic trust
literature, trust has been measured in two ways: endorsement and preference (see Tong et
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al., 2020 for review). Endorsement is typically measured by having two informants give
conflicting information and asking the participant to pick which informant gave the
correct information. To measure preference for an informant, the participant is asked
which informant they would direct a question to in the future or which informant would
know more about a topic. Although Lutz and Keil (2002) and Aguiar et al. (2012)
measured preference for each informant, these studies did not include measurements of
how children evaluated the information provided by the informants (i.e., endorsements).
The inclusion of endorsement items in selective trust studies allows for a better
understanding of children’s beliefs about experts and how children trust experts. For
example, when two experts (i.e., an eagle expert and bicycle expert) gave conflicting
labels to novel objects in 3 different domains (i.e., birds, vehicles, and neutral items), 4and 5-year-olds endorsed labels given by the eagle expert in the bird domain and the
bicycle expert in the vehicle domain more often than chance (Landrum et al., 2013;
Experiment 1). Four- and 5-year-olds also did not endorse one expert over the other in the
neutral domain. These results demonstrate that children can monitor the relevance of
informants’ expertise and use expertise as an indicator of whom to trust.
Children also rely on an informant’s expertise when revising their judgments. In a
study with 3- to 6-year-olds, participants were introduced to two informants who could
both correctly name familiar animals, but only one could name an unfamiliar animal
while the other was ignorant (Rakoczy et al., 2015; Experiment 1). Children were then
asked to judge how much food (i.e., piles of hay) was needed to feed the animal. Children
made initial judgments (e.g., 2 piles) and then one of the informants gave a different
judgment (e.g., 4 piles). Children were then asked to provide a final answer. In this study,
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children were more likely to revise their judgment to match that of the knowledgeable
informant than the ignorant informant. Also, children’s ratings of the informant’s
competence mediated the revisions, such that children who judged the informant as
competent were more likely to revise their judgments than children who did not judge the
informant as competent.
Although children as young as 3-years-old can use expertise to help guide their
trust, learning, and judgments, expertise is not the only characteristic children monitor
when deciding from whom they want to seek out information. They also use
characteristics such as familiarity (e.g., Corriveau et al., 2009; Danovitch & Mills, 2014),
benevolence (e.g., Landrum et al., 2013; Lane et al., 2013; Mascaro & Sperber, 2009),
and accuracy (e.g., Birch et al., 2008; Harris & Corriveau, 2011; Pasquini et al., 2007;
Vanderbilt et al., 2014). Landrum et al. (2013) demonstrated that when expertise conflicts
with benevolence, children’s trust in experts begins to change and children may rely on
benevolent characteristics more than expertise when deciding who to trust. For example,
when an expert was perceived as mean (i.e., crossing his arms and talking in a grumpy
voice), children were less likely to endorse information provided by the expert. Instead,
they preferred to endorse information from a nice informant who did not have relevant
expertise. Similarly, Boseovski and Thurman (2014) found that 3- to 5-year-olds
endorsed an expert’s (i.e., zookeeper’s) testimony more often than a maternal figure’s
testimony, regardless of whether the testimony was positive (e.g., an animal described as
friendly) or negative (e.g., an animal described as dangerous). However, 6- to 7-year-olds
were less likely to endorse an expert’s claim when the expert provided negative
testimony about an unknown animal. These studies suggest that children do not always
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endorse information provided by experts. Instead, children evaluate other characteristics
of the expert and also evaluate the type of statements the experts make.
An informant’s perceived competence can not only be manipulated by labeling an
informant as an expert or not, but it can also be manipulated by changing the history of
accuracy of the informant. In these studies, one informant gives correct labels to familiar
objects over a few trials and the other informant either gives incorrect labels or is
ignorant about the objects’ labels (Clément et al., 2004; Jaswal & Neely, 2006; Koenig et
al., 2004; Koenig & Harris, 2005; Pasquini et al., 2007). Children as young as 3-years-old
can track the accuracy of these informants and endorse and prefer novel information from
the previously accurate informants more often than the inaccurate or ignorant informants.
Additional selective trust studies found that children displayed this preference even a
week after observing an informant’s inaccuracy (Corriveau & Harris, 2009b) and that the
amount of inaccurate information provided by an informant also influences children’s
preferences (Pasquini et al., 2007). Specifically, by age 7, children only need a single
encounter with an inaccurate informant to use this information to make their trust
decisions (Fitneva & Dunfield, 2010).
Although previous research has not directly studied the interaction of accuracy
and expertise, some research has looked at the interaction between accuracy and other
characteristics, such as familiarity (e.g., Corriveau & Harris, 2009a; Danovitch & Mills,
2014). Corriveau and Harris (2009a) found that when familiarity was crossed with
accuracy, 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds tracked accuracy beyond the influence of familiarity.
When there was no history of accuracy/inaccuracy provided, children preferred to ask for
and endorse information provided by their familiar teacher. However, once the
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participants were shown that the familiar teacher was inaccurate, 4- and 5-year-olds
preferred to ask for and endorse information from an unfamiliar teacher who was
accurate. This study suggests that accuracy plays a strong role in children’s trust in
informants. It is important to note that in early childhood education, teachers are key
figures of epistemic authority for children (Olson & Bruner, 1996). Because children
might perceive their teachers to be knowledgeable and have expertise, it is possible that
when weighing both inaccuracy and expertise, inaccuracy plays a larger role in children’s
judgments. However, because a teacher’s expertise is often in an ambiguous domain (i.e.,
pedagogy), children might not recognize the teacher’s specific expertise and believe their
knowledge is more broad. The current study aims to measure the relation between
expertise and accuracy directly by including familiar experts that children as young as 5years-old can recognize and to whom they attribute domain specific knowledge (Lutz &
Keil, 2002).
Further research on selective trust including experts has looked at other
characteristics of the expert’s statements such as counter-intuitiveness (Lane & Harris,
2015) and conflicting with a consensus (Boseovski et al., 2017). Replicating previous
work, children ages 3 to 8 trusted a relevant expert more often than an irrelevant expert
when endorsing claims about novel entities (Lane & Harris, 2015). Interestingly, when
the relevant experts made a claim that was counterintuitive (e.g., an animal expert
claiming that an animal can see through things or never has to eat anything), children 5to 8-years-old were less accepting of the expert’s claims compared to younger children.
The children may have believed the counterintuitive claims were inaccurate and therefore
trusted the relevant expert less than the irrelevant expert who provided the intuitive
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claims. This finding suggests that older children may be more sensitive to what an expert
says than to whether their expertise is relevant to the domain of knowledge in question. In
another study, children 4- to 8-years-old heard claims from an expert and three
laypersons who disagreed with the expert’s claims (Boseovski et al., 2017). Although it
was possible that children could have judged the expert’s claims as inaccurate because a
consensus of three non-experts disagreed with the claim, children endorsed the expert’s
claims and preferred to seek out information from him in the future regardless of the
consensus’ conflicting claim. This finding suggests that children may continue to believe
an expert is knowledgeable about their domain of expertise even after hearing multiple
conflicting claims. The limitations of the studies described above are that the
characteristics of experts they define as counter-intuitive (i.e., contrary to common-sense)
and anti-consensus (i.e., against the general agreement) could be understood by children
as inaccuracy. Children are skeptical of counter-intuitive claims (Lane & Harris, 2014)
and therefore might believe the expert’s claims to be inaccurate. Also, children are more
likely to believe information provided by multiple people rather than a single person and
therefore they might also believe the expert to be inaccurate. The current study aims to
directly measure children’s understanding of experts who are inaccurate.
Current Studies
The current studies used a mixed factorial study design to explore the influence of
an informant’s history of inaccuracy on children’s preference for the expert and their
judgments of the informant’s knowledge. The methods and analyses were preregistered
with the Open Science Framework (Study 1:
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https://osf.io/u2g3w/?view_only=7ed2be2b56d34f7097381c260a477c21; Study 2:
https://osf.io/8rqgj/?view_only=7c68ddd2994145389275a14fe6d778bb).
Participants were ages 6 to 9 for several reasons. First, although research has
shown that, by 3-years-old, children have an understanding of expertise, this
understanding improves with age (Landrum et al., 2013). These studies rely on children
having a strong understanding of expertise and belief in experts having high levels of
knowledge. Second, in order to use the numerical rating scale described later in the
methods, children needed to have good number sense. Children usually receive their first
formal instruction in arithmetic in kindergarten. To make sure that children in my study
would not only be able to label the values on the number line, but also have the number
sense to know the quantities each number holds and their relation as more or less to one
another, participants were 6-years-old or older. Third, previous research on children’s
trust in inaccurate informants has shown no difference between 4- and 7-year-olds’
responses (Ronfard & Lane, 2019); however, adults show a different pattern of results
than 4- to 7-year-olds, such that adults’ gradually grew more distrusting while children
quickly distrusted a repeatedly inaccurate informant. It is possible that including a
slightly older age group (8- and 9-year-olds) could reveal a significant difference in
children’s judgments of inaccurate experts between age groups. Thus, the current studies
included 2 age-groups, 6- through 7-year-olds and 8- through 9-year-olds.
Recent research using the selective trust paradigm has found individual
differences in children’s preferences (e.g., Cossette et al., 2020; Juteau et al., 2019).
Therefore, researchers suggest using alternative methods of measuring children’s
preference and beliefs about individuals who provide testimony and have different

8

epistemic characteristics (Hermes et al., 2018; Guerrero et al., 2020; Juteau et al., 2019).
The current studies include some methods from the selective trust literature (i.e., asking
children “who knows more about X?”), but also integrate a new measure of
knowledgeability (i.e., asking children to rate how much the expert knows about a topic).
Children in both studies were asked which expert (i.e., a doctor and a mechanic) knew
more about each domain of expertise (i.e., bodies and cars) and also rated how much they
believed the two experts knew about their relative domains of expertise. Then, across 4
consecutive trials, children heard one expert provide an inaccurate answer to an
experimenter’s question. After each inaccurate answer, children were asked why they
believed the expert said the specific statement and again rated how much each expert
knew about their relative domain of expertise. After the 4 inaccurate trials, children were
asked again which expert knew more about each domain of expertise.
Based on the existing selective trust research (e.g., Aguiar et al., 2012; Lutz &
Keil, 2002), I predicted that children would rate the expert as having a high level of
knowledge in that domain before hearing any inaccurate answers. However, because
children are sensitive to an informant’s history of inaccuracy (e.g., Corriveau & Harris,
2009b; Pasquini et al., 2007), across the 4 trials, children were expected to decrease their
knowledge rating of the inaccurate expert. Overall, older children were expected to rate
the inaccurate expert as having a lower amount of knowledge in their relevant domain
than younger children. However, participants were expected to judge the control expert
(i.e., the expert who does not provide any information) as having knowledge in both the
related and unrelated domains after observing the inaccurate expert give incorrect
answers over multiple trials. A recent review by Marble and Boseovski (2020) argues that
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a limitation in research on children’s selective social learning is that much of the
literature claims to include a “neutral informant.” However, sometimes this informant
provides other testimony (instead of providing useful information e.g., “this is a dog”, the
informant provides random information e.g., “this is nice”) that although intended to be
neutral, gives children some information about that informant (e.g., they say positive
things; Koenig & Jaswal, 2011). To better understand inaccuracy specifically, the control
expert was a neutral control, such that he did not provide any information that could
influence children’s perceptions of him other than being described as an expert in his
domain.
Along with judging the expert’s amount of knowledge after hearing each incorrect
answer, children were prompted to explain why the expert gave inaccurate answers. In
Study 1, children gave an open-ended explanation and, in Study 2, children chose
between two explanations. Some studies have asked children to explain why they
preferred to direct their question to one expert over another (e.g., Butler et al., 2020;
Williams & Danovitch, 2019), why they believe one informant to be correct (e.g.,
Guerrero et al., 2017), or given children a choice between two explanations for why an
informant gave an inaccurate answer (e.g., Corriveau & Harris, 2009a; Hermansen et al.,
2021, Exp. 2; Ronfard & Lane, 2019). However, I am unaware of any studies that ask
children to give open-ended explanations for why the informant said what they did.
Ronfard and Lane (2019) offered a forced-choice explanation for why the informant gave
an inaccurate answer and asked 4- to 7-year-olds if an informant provided an inaccurate
answer because of a mistake or on purpose. The results showed that older children (5.5to 7-year-olds) were more likely to say the inaccurate information was intentional (i.e., on
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purpose) than younger children (4 to 5.5-year-olds). Because Study 1 uses an open-ended
format, it was unclear whether the children in this study (i.e., older than 5.5 years) would
attribute intent without being prompted with a forced-choice. Guerrero et al. (2017) did
ask children an open-ended question; however, it was to explain why they believed the
expert was right, not why the expert said a specific answer. They found that children’s
responses fell into three categories: 1) knowledge attributed to the informant (e.g., saying
the informant knows about the topic), 2) commenting on the object referred to in the
testimony (e.g., seeing a picture of the object and describing a physical quality of it), and
3) circular or undifferentiated responses with no additional reasons (e.g., simply repeating
the testimony of the informant). Because the informants in the current studies would be
giving obviously wrong answers, I predicted that children would produce opposite
explanations of the first and third categories used in Guerrero et al. (2017) when asked
why the expert said the answer (e.g., not attributing knowledge to the informant and
saying the testimony is wrong rather than simply repeating it).
Across two studies, children rated an expert’s knowledge across multiple trials. I
predicted there to be an influence of the positivity bias on children’s judgments of the
expert’s knowledge. The positivity bias is the idea that children pay attention to and
process information selectively to have a positive view of themselves and/or others.
Previous research suggests that a positivity bias in social judgments (e.g., judging if a
person is mean or nice) emerges as early as 3-years-old, peaks in middle childhood, and
decreases by ages 10 to 11 (see Boseovski, 2010, for a review). Also, previous research
has shown that when given positive information about an individual (i.e., they are nice),
3- to 6-year-olds only need one piece of evidence to judge that individual as having a

11

positive trait. However, when given negative information about an individual (i.e., they
are mean) children need multiple pieces of evidence before they label that individual with
a negative trait (Boseovski & Lee, 2006). Because the current studies included negatively
valenced judgments (i.e., rating that the individual has low knowledge), I expected
children to decrease their knowledge ratings most significantly after they received
multiple examples of inaccuracy. Specifically, because the positivity bias is the strongest
in middle childhood, I hypothesized that 6- and 7-year-olds would show the largest
decrease in their knowledge rating of the expert after hearing 3 or 4 inaccurate answers,
while 8- and 9-year-olds would only need to hear 1 or 2 inaccurate answers before
decreasing their knowledge rating significantly. The positivity bias would also relate to
children’s explanations for why the expert said the inaccurate information. I predicted
older children would make more negative explanations (e.g., the expert does not know
anything) than younger children and that children who made more negative explanations
would rate the expert as having less knowledge than children who did not give negative
explanations or gave fewer negative explanations.
Study 2 replicates the results of Study 1 and examined how children’s opinions
about the inaccurate expert relate to their behavior when they need to rely on expertise to
win a game. Children were provided the same information as in Study 1, and then played
a game that required the expertise of both experts (inaccurate and control). As mentioned
previously, Study 2 also further examined children’s explanations for the inaccurate
answers provided by the expert by making children choose from the two most frequently
produced explanations from Study 1.
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Theoretical and Practical Significance
Children are social learners and much of the previous literature has suggested that
children not only understand expertise, but they also rely on an individual’s expertise to
help learn about certain topics. However, in real life, experts do not always provide the
correct answer. It is important to further understand what children think about experts
who provide inaccurate information. These studies will demonstrate how an informant’s
accuracy and expertise influence children’s judgments of the informant’s knowledge. The
current studies will add to the large literature on children’s social learning and expertise
(see Marble & Boseovski, 2020 for a review). Marble and Boseovski (2020) suggest that
when children make social learning judgments (e.g., endorsement of information),
children consider cues of knowledge (e.g., expertise, accuracy, consensus) as well as
evaluate information at both the person level (e.g., traits such as in-group status) and
content level (e.g., valence of information provided). The current studies further
investigated this theory of social learning by examining children’s judgments of the
expert overall (knowledge attribution) and at the content level (explaining why the expert
said the inaccurate answer).
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CHAPTER II
STUDY 1
Methods
Participants
The minimum number of participants required was determined by an ANOVA:
Repeated Measures, within-between interaction power analysis using G*Power (Faul et
al., 2007). The analysis indicated that a sample size of 80 would have adequate power to
detect a significant interaction with a small to moderate effect size of effect size of .15
(with power of .8, and an alpha error probability of .05). Participants included 40 6- to 7year-olds (20 males, 20 females; Mage = 7.04, SD = .09) and 40 8- to 9-year-olds (22
males, 18 females; Mage = 8.98, SD = .09). Four additional participants were excluded
from analysis. Two 6-year-olds failed the scale training questions and were unable to
maintain attention on the task, and one 7-year-old and one 8-year-old were receiving
input from siblings. Seventy-nine percent of parents identified their child as
White/Caucasian, 10% identified as Asian, 1% identified as Black/African-American,
and the other 10% identified as belonging to 2 or more races. Ninety-five percent of
parents identified their child as Not Hispanic or Latino, 2.5% participants identified as
Hispanic or Latino, and the other 2.5% of participants did not answer.
Participants were recruited using social media accounts (e.g., Facebook and
Instagram) or from http://childrenhelpingscience.org. Children received a certificate and
a $5 Amazon gift card for their participation.
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Materials
Expert Images
Based on previous research showing that children can recognize familiar experts’
domains of knowledge (e.g., Lutz & Keil, 2002), a doctor and a car mechanic were
selected as the experts for this study. Two different images of White middle-aged, greyhaired, smiling men with similar features represented the experts (see Appendix A). The
first image showed a doctor wearing a lab coat over a blue shirt and tie with a stethoscope
around his neck. The second image showed a mechanic wearing a blue jumpsuit with a
wrench in the breast pocket.
Question and Answer Pairs
Thirteen pairs of questions and incorrect answers were initially developed about
the body (i.e., doctor questions) and 13 pairs were developed about cars (i.e., mechanic
questions). Some questions were inspired by previous research on children’s
understanding of expertise (Lutz & Keil, 2002) and some answers were inspired by
previous research on children’s explanation evaluation (Johnston et al., 2019). Five adults
read each question and answer pair and rated how wrong each answer was using a 5 point
scale (1 = not wrong at all and 5 = extremely wrong). Mean scores for each of the 13
questions and answer pairs per domain ranged from 3.6 to 5.0. Four question and answer
pairs were selected for each expert because they could be matched for question type (i.e.,
for each domain, there was 1 “what” question, 1 “how many” question, and 2 “which
part” questions; see Appendix B). Adults’ mean ratings did not differ by more than .2 for
each matched question (M = 4.90 for doctor questions, M = 4.75 for mechanic questions).
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The answers for both experts were audio recorded by a native English-speaking middleaged male.
Procedure
Children were tested individually by a female experimenter. The study took place
over Zoom, an online video conferencing application. All participants completed the
study from their own computer or tablet. Families were instructed to not use Zoom on a
smartphone. Some parents were present in the room during the session and were
instructed to keep a neutral expression and return the child’s attention to the
experimenter/screen if necessary. See Figure 1 for order of presentation of the study
procedure.
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Figure 1
Schematic of Procedure for Study 1 with Titles in Bold Font Indicating Dependent
Measures

Counting Check
Before the study began, participants were asked to count to 7 in order to ensure
that they could use the 7-point scale. All study participants were able to count to 7
without help.
Scale Training
Participants were told that the experimenter was going to talk about people and
the participants would be asked how much a person knows about something. They were
trained to show how much a person knows using a 7-point knowledge scale, where 1
meant that a person does not know anything and 7 meant that a person knows more than
anybody else. Children were shown the 7-point scale on the screen and told what each
point meant (see Appendix C). Below each mark on the number line scale were clusters
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of stars corresponding to each number. Previous research examining children’s
knowledge ratings has used varying amounts of stars to represent amounts of knowledge
(e.g., Boseovski & Thurman, 2014; Mills & Keil, 2004). Participants then completed 3
practice questions. For the three practice questions, children were introduced to three
individuals consecutively: 1) A person (Bobby) who knows more about dinosaurs than
anybody else, 2) A person (Sarah) who does not know anything about spaceships, and 3)
A person (Larry) who knows some things about trees. After each person was introduced,
children were asked to use the scale to show how much that person knew about each
topic (e.g., “How many stars show that Bobby knows more about dinosaurs than anybody
else?”). If a participant answered a practice question incorrectly, they were informed of
the correct answer and asked to select their answer again (e.g., “Remember, 7 stars means
a person knows more than anybody else. So how many stars means that Bobby knows
more about dinosaurs than anybody else?”). Participants were excluded from analysis if
they incorrectly answered any of the practice questions after being informed of the
correct answer.
Expert Introduction
After children were trained on how to use the scale, they were introduced to the
experts. Children were told that “a doctor is a person who helps people when they are
sick or hurt and makes sure that people are healthy” and “a car mechanic is a person who
fixes cars when there is something wrong with them and makes sure cars run well”
(based on Lutz & Keil, 2002). While the experimenter said each introduction, the expert’s
image was displayed on the computer screen.
Knowledge Attribution Pre-test
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To check that children could match the expert with their domain of knowledge,
children were asked, “who knows more about people’s bodies, this doctor or this
mechanic?” and “who knows more about people’s cars, this doctor or this mechanic?”
Previous research has shown that children as young as 5-years-old can correctly attribute
knowledge to experts more than 90% of the time (Landrum et al., 2013; Lutz & Keil,
2002). If children answered either knowledge attribution question incorrectly, they were
corrected.
Pre-test Knowledge Rating
Using the 7-point knowledge scale, participants rated how much each expert knew
about their domain of knowledge (i.e., “How much does the doctor know about bodies?”
and “How much does the mechanic know about cars?”).
Inaccuracy Trials with Answer Explanation and Knowledge Ratings
Participants were randomized into one of two conditions (i.e., inaccurate doctor or
inaccurate mechanic). Participants then heard 4 question and inaccurate answer pairs.
Participants in the inaccurate doctor condition only heard the experimenter ask doctor
questions and the doctor produced all the inaccurate answers. Participants in the
inaccurate mechanic condition only heard the experimenter ask mechanic questions and
the mechanic produced all the inaccurate answers. The experimenter said they wanted to
know some things about people’s bodies or cars, so they asked the doctor or mechanic
(depending on condition). The experimenter said, “Let’s hear what the doctor/mechanic
said” and asked the question aloud (e.g., “How many bones are in a person’s hand?”).
The participant then heard an audio recording of the expert’s response (e.g., “People
don’t have any bones in their hands”) while viewing the expert’s image, along with a
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speech bubble with the written transcription of the audio, on the screen. To
counterbalance the order of questions, a 4x4 Latin square was used to create 4 orders of
questions for both conditions.
After each inaccurate answer, the experimenter asked the participant why they
thought the expert said that answer (e.g., “Why do you think the doctor said people don’t
have any bones in their hands?”). If the participant said, “I don’t know” or did not give an
answer, the experimenter prompted the child “to take their best guess.” If the child said,
“I don’t know” again or did not give an answer after 4 seconds of silence, their response
was recorded as an “I don’t know/no answer.” All other explanations were transcribed
and coded. After giving their explanation, participants rated how much the inaccurate
expert knew and how much the control expert knew about their relevant domain of
expertise using the 7-point knowledge scale. In both conditions, the other expert was used
as a neutral control.
Knowledge Attribution Post-Test
After the 4 Inaccuracy trials with explanations and knowledge ratings,
participants were asked again “who knows more about people’s bodies, this doctor or this
mechanic?” and “who knows more about people’s cars, this doctor or this mechanic?”.
Explanation Coding
Children’s responses to the Answer Explanation questions were transcribed and
coded by two independent coders blind to participant’s age. Explanations were coded into
two general non-exclusive categories: Expert Focused and Statement Focused (see Figure
2).
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Expert Focused explanations included a reference to the expert. Within this code,
there were 2 subcategories: 1) General Trait Attribution, and 2) Trial Specific
explanations. General Trait Attributions referred to the expert’s general characteristics
(e.g., “He is crazy” or “He doesn’t know about anything”). General Trait Attributions had
3 sub-subcategories: Positive (e.g., “He is smart”), Negative (e.g., “He is not smart”), and
Ambiguous (e.g., “He is silly”). Trial Specific explanations referred to the expert and his
statements on each trial (e.g., “Maybe he can’t see the bones” or “He is wrong”). There
were also two sub-categories of Trial Specific explanations: Excuse (e.g., “maybe he
can’t see the bones”, “he forgot the right answer”, or “he doesn’t know about bones”) and
No Excuse (e.g., “he is wrong” or “he is lying”).
Statement Focused explanations were any explanations that did not include a
reference to the expert and that solely focused on the statement. Statement Focused
explanations differed from Trial Specific explanations because Statement Focused
explanations disregarded the expert entirely and simply focused on the statement alone
with no connection to who said the statement. Statement Focused explanations had 2
subcategories: 1) Statement Endorsement and 2) Statement Rejection. Statement
Endorsement explanations claimed that the expert’s answer was correct without reference
to the expert himself (e.g., “That is right”) or repeated the inaccurate answer (e.g.,
“People don’t have bones in their hands”) and Statement Rejection explanations claimed
that the expert’s answer was incorrect without reference to the expert himself (e.g.,
“That’s not true”) or the participant providing a different answer than the expert gave
(e.g., “People do have bones in their hands”).
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Figure 2
Flowchart of Coding Scheme for Explanations in Study 1

Results
Knowledge Attribution Pre-Test
All participants attributed biological knowledge to the doctor. All but one 6-yearold and two 9-year-olds attributed mechanical knowledge to the mechanic 1.
Change in Knowledge Rating
Preliminary analyses revealed no effects of gender or trial order, so these
variables were excluded from further analyses.
A 2 (age group: younger or older) x 2 (condition: doctor or mechanic) x 5 (time:
1, 2, 3, 4, 5) mixed-factorial ANOVA examining change in knowledge ratings for the
inaccurate expert resulted in a significant value for Mauchly's Test of Sphericity,

1

Removing these participants does not change the results of the following analyses; therefore, they were
included for all analyses.
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therefore Greenhouse - Geiser corrections are reported for the following results. There
was a significant main effect of time, F(2.71, 256.59) = 88.21, p < .001, η2 = .537. Posthoc pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni correction (critical p = .005 for 10
comparisons) for each time point resulted in all significant differences, ps < .002,
suggesting that participants decreased their knowledge ratings at each time point. There
was no significant main effect of age or condition, Fs < .79, ps > .37. There were also no
significant interactions, Fs < 2.63, ps > .11. The linear trend contrast for knowledge
ratings was significant, F(2.71, 256.59) = 189.58, p < .001, η2 = .714, such that children
decreased their knowledge ratings for the inaccurate expert as he provided more
inaccurate information over time (see Figure 3). These results suggest that regardless of
age and whether the inaccurate expert was a doctor or a mechanic, participants decreased
their knowledge rating of the inaccurate expert across all time points.
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Figure 3
Children’s Average Knowledge Ratings for the Inaccurate Expert Over 5 Time Points by
Age Group and Condition for Study 1

Average Knowledge Rating for Inaccurate
Expert
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Time 2

Time 3
Time 4
Knowledge Ratings

Time 5

A second mixed-factorial ANOVA using the knowledge ratings for the control
expert resulted in no significant main effects or interactions, Fs < 2.78, ps > .10. This
suggests that participants did not change their knowledge rating for the control expert
over time (see Figure 4).
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Figure 4
Children’s Average Knowledge Ratings for the Control Expert Over 5 Time Points by
Age Group and Condition for Study 1
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Explanations
Two independent coders, blind to the participant’s age, coded 40% of the
explanations. Overall percent agreement was 96.18% and there was high interrater
reliability (Cohen’s κ = .87). Disagreements were resolved through discussion. Each
coder then coded 30% of the sample on their own. Table 1 displays the frequency of each
explanation type across all 4 trials (N=318; 1 trial for 1 6-year-old and 1 8-year-old were
not codable due to audio recording error).
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Table 1
Frequency of Explanation Codes in Study 1 Combined Across All Trials
Age Group
6- & 7-year-olds
8- & 9-year-olds
Explanation code
(n=159 trials)
(n=159 trials)
Expert Focused Total
58 (36%)
85 (53%)
General Trait Positive
1 (1%)
1 (1%)
General Trait Negative
21 (13%)
29 (18%)
General Trait Ambiguous
7 (4%)
9 (6%)
Trial Specific Excuse
25 (16%)
38 (24%)
Trial Specific No Excuse
4 (3%)
8 (5%)
Statement Focused Total
78 (49%)
49 (31%)
Statement Endorsement
41 (26%)
33 (21%)
Statement Rejection
37 (23%)
16 (10%)
I Don’t Know/No Answer
27 (17%)
21 (13%)
Not Codable
3 (2%)
8 (5%)
Note. Expert Focused and Statement Focused explanations were not mutually exclusive;
therefore, totals are more than 100%.
Table 2 displays the means and standard deviations for the total production for
each explanation by age group. There was no significant difference between age groups
for the production of Expert Focused explanations, t(78) = -1.91, p = .059. However,
there was a significant difference between age groups for the production of Statement
Focused explanations, t(78) = 2.87, p = .025, suggesting that younger children were more
likely than older children to produce Statement Focused explanations.

26

Table 2
Average Total Production of Explanation Codes in Study 1 by Age Group with Mean and
Standard Deviation
Age Group
Explanation code
6- & 7-year-olds
8- & 9-year-olds
(n=40)
(n=40)
Expert Focused Total
1.45 (1.55)
2.13 (1.60)
General Trait Positive
.03 (.16)
.03 (.16)
General Trait Negative
.52 (1.15)
.73 (1.15)
General Trait Ambiguous
.18 (.68)
.23 (.80)
Trial Specific Excuse
.63 (1.08)
.95 (1.22)
Trial Specific No Excuse
.10 (.38)
.20 (.69)
Statement Focused Total
1.95 (1.47)
1.23 (1.37)
Statement Endorsement
1.03 (1.29)
.83 (1.20)
Statement Rejection
.93 (1.29)
.40 (.93)
I Don’t Know/No Answer
.68 (1.14)
.53 (1.09)
Not Codable
.08 (.27)
.20 (.72)
Note. Expert Focused and Statement Focused explanations were not mutually exclusive.
Prediction of Change in Knowledge Rating
Hierarchical linear regression was used to assess the contribution of each
predictor to children’s knowledge ratings for the inaccurate expert at each time point (see
Table 3). Actual scores at each time point were used rather than difference scores because
some children gave a rating of 7 across all 5 time points while others dropped to a 1
rating after 1 time point and continued to stay at a 1 for the following 4 time points. If the
analysis included difference scores, those who gave a rating of 7 with no change or those
who gave a 1 with no change would be considered to have the same ratings. Actual
scores were also included to account for the variations between participants.
Because they were produced less than 10% of the time, explanations coded as
General Trait Positive, General Trait Ambiguous, Trial Specific No Excuse and
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Nonsense were excluded from analyses 2. Because data was analyzed across all 4 trials,
the assumption of independence was violated when age and condition were included in
the analysis. Therefore, a “Participant” variable was created such that each participant
was randomly assigned a number to control for the variance of each individual participant
across the 4 trials.
Participant, Age (measured continuously), and Condition were entered into Block
1 yielding a significant model, F(3, 314) = 3.30, p = .021, that explained 3.1% of the
variance in knowledge ratings. Age (B = -.37, p = .002) was the only significant predictor
in Block 1. Production of Expert Focused explanations, specifically General Trait
Negative & Trial Specific Excuse, was added in Block 2 and the total amount of variance
accounted for significantly increased to 12.3%, ΔR2 = .09, F change (2, 312) = 16.40, p <
.001, and the overall model was significant, F(5, 312) = 8.73, p < .001. Age (B = -.31, p =
.007) and General Trait Negative explanations (B = -2.17, p < .001) were the only
significant predictors in Block 2. Production of Statement Focused explanations,
specifically Statement Focused Endorsement and Statement Focused Rejection, were
entered in Block 3 and the amount of variance accounted for significantly increased to
16.7%, ΔR2 = .04, F change (2, 310) = 8.23, p < .001, and the overall model was again
significant, F(7, 310) = 8.88, p < .001. Age (B = -.31, p = .008). General Trait Negative
(B = -1.63, p < .001) and Statement Focused Endorsement (B = 1.32, p < .001) were the
only significant predictors in Block 3. Finally, I Don’t Know/No Answer was entered in
Block 4 and the amount of variance accounted for (17.5%) did not significantly increase,
ΔR2 = .01, F change (1, 309) = 3.08, p = .080, but the overall model was still significant,

2

Adding these four types of explanations back into the analysis does not significantly change the overall
model, F change (4, 305) = 1.64, p = .164.

28

F(8, 309) = 8.20 , p < .001. Age (B = -.29, p = .012). General Trait Negative (B = -1.28, p
= .003), and Statement Focused Endorsement (B = 1.70, p < .001) continued to be the
only significant predictors in Block 4. Thus, the final model showed that older children
gave lower ratings to the inaccurate expert than younger children. Also, children who
produced General Trait Negative explanations were more likely to give lower ratings to
the inaccurate expert than those who did not produce this explanation. Finally, children
who produced Statement Focused Endorsement explanations were more likely to give
higher ratings to the inaccurate expert than those who did not produce this explanation.
Table 3
Hierarchical Regression Results Predicting Children’s Knowledge Ratings for the
Inaccurate Expert in Study 1 (N = 318)
Block 1
Predictors

B

Participant

.00

Age

**

SE

β

B

.00

.01

-.00

-.17

.27

-.01

-.31

SE

β

B

.01

-.01

-.00

-.15

-.04

.26

-.01

General Trait
Negative

-2.04***

.36

Trial Specific
Excuse

-.13

.33

**

-.31

Block 4

SE

β

B

.01

.00

.00

SE

β

.01

.00

*

.12

-.14

-.29

.12

-.14

-.16

.26

-.03

-.09

.26

-.02

-.31

-1.63***

.38

-.25

-1.28**

.43

-.19

-.02

.33

.36

.05

.70

.42

.12

Statement
Focused
Endorsement

1.32***

.34

.23

1.70***

.41

.30

Statement
Focused
Rejection

.11

.39

.02

.49

.44

.08

.81

.46

.12

-.07

.12

**

Block 3

.12

Condition

-.37

Block 2

I Don’t
Know/ No
Answer
R2

.03*

ΔR2

.12***

.17***

.18***

.09***

.04***

.01

* p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001
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Exploratory Analysis of Knowledge Rating
Due to the knowledge ratings having a bi-modal (i.e., non-normal) distribution, an
exploratory analysis was conducted such that children were categorized into 1 of 3
groups of responders: children in the “Never Drop” category never rated the expert below
a 4, children in the “Fast Drop” category dropped their rating by at least 2 points after
hearing only 1 inaccurate answer, and children in the “Slow Drop” category dropped their
rating by at least 2 points after more than 1 inaccurate answer or only dropped their rating
by 1 across all trials (see Table 4 for breakdown by age group).
Table 4
Frequency of Participant in Each Type of Rater Response by Age Group

Age Group
Younger
Older

Never Drop
11
12

Category of Rater Response
Fast Drop
22
16

Slow Drop
7
12

A post-hoc goodness-of-fit power analysis in G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) using a
sample size of 80, α = .05, and effect size of .30 resulted in power = .48. Because of this
low power and to be consistent with the previous analyses, the multinomial logistic
regression was analyzed based on children’s responses to individual trials (N = 318). A
multinomial logistic regression was conducted with Category of Rater Response as the
dependent variable with 3 levels (i.e., Never Drop, Fast Drop, and Slow Drop) and the
same variables as the previous analysis for the independent variables (i.e., Participant,
Age (continuous), Condition, and production of General Trait Negative, Trial Specific
Excuse, Statement Focused Endorsement, and Statement Focused Rejection explanations;
see Table 5 for breakdown of independent variables by category).
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Table 5
Characteristics of The Independent Variables by Categories of Rater Response (N = 318)
Independent Variable

Participant
Age (continuous)
Condition
Doctor
Mechanic
General Trait Negative
Produced
Not Produced
Trial Specific Excuse
Produced
Not Produced
Statement Focused Endorsement
Produced
Not Produced
Statement Focused Rejection
Produced
Not Produced

Category of Rater Response
Never Drop
Fast Drop
Slow Drop
M (SD)
M (SD)
M (SD)
38.53 (24.19) 39.87 (23.51) 44.16 (20.53)
7.64 (1.11)

8.23 (1.06)

F(2, 315)
1.36

p
.259

8.04 (1.13)

7.48

< .001

χ (df)
2.69 (2)

p
.260

16.94 (2)

< .001

7.48 (2)

.024

14.39 (2)

< .001

20.46 (2)

< .001

N

N

N

43
48

71
80

44
32

3
88

35
116

12
64

23
68

33
118

7
69

34
57

28
123

12
64

14
77

14
137

25
51

2

Pearson’s goodness-of-fit statistics (χ2 = 633.59, df = 144, N = 302, p < 0.001)
and the omnibus test for the final model were both significant (LR χ2 = 75.26, df = 14, N
= 318, p < 0.001), indicating that the independent variables were collectively and
significantly associated with each child’s response category. The Nagelkerke pseudo R2 =
0.240, meaning that the model accounted for 24% of the overall variance. Table 6
displays the estimated multinomial logistic regression coefficients that predicted category
of rater response for each independent variable included in the model. Note that
explanations in the model are analyzed for “Not Produced” such that positive coefficients
indicate the explanation was not produced, and negative coefficients indicate that it was
produced. As shown in Table 6, children were more likely to never drop their rating of
the inaccurate expert relative to children who slowly dropped their rating if they were
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younger, did not produce a general trait negative explanation, and if they produced a trial
specific excuse and statement focused endorsement explanation. Children were more
likely to quickly drop their rating of the inaccurate expert relative to children who slowly
dropped their rating if they did not produce a statement focused rejection explanation.
Lastly, children were more likely to quickly drop their rating of the inaccurate expert
relative to children who never dropped their rating, if they were older, produced a general
trait negative explanation, and if they did not produce a statement focused endorsements.
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Table 6
Independent Variables Associated with Category of Rater Response in the Final
Multinomial Logistic Regression Model
Variable
B
SE Wald
p
Never Drop Relative to Slow Drop
Intercept
4.50 1.75 6.61
.010
Participant
-.02 .01 4.48
.034
Age (continuous)
-.47 .16 8.38
.004
Condition
-.44 .35 1.58
.209
General Trait Negative
1.43 .71 4.06
.044
Trial Specific Excuse
-1.26 .54 5.49
.019
Statement Focused Endorsement
-1.06 .46 5.34
.021
Statement Focused Rejection
.95
.49 3.83
.050
Fast Drop Relative to Slow Drop
Intercept
1.01 1.45 .48
.487
Participant
-.01 .01 2.31
.129
Age (continuous)
-.00 .14
.00
.990
Condition
-.58 .31 3.46
.063
General Trait Negative
-.26 .42
.38
.538
Trial Specific Excuse
-.73 .49 2.18
.140
Statement Focused Endorsement
.00
.43
.00
.993
Statement Focused Rejection
1.53 .44 12.17 < .001
Fast Drop Relative to Never Drop
Intercept
-3.50 1.51 5.39
.020
Participant
.01
.01
.82
.367
Age (continuous)
.46
.14 11.54 < .001
Condition
-.14 .30
.21
.646
General Trait Negative
-1.68 .65 6.70
.010
Trial Specific Excuse
.53
.39 1.84
.175
Statement Focused Endorsement
1.06 .38 8.03
.005
Statement Focused Rejection
.58
.48 1.42
.233
Note. OR, odds ratio; CI, confidence interval.

OR

95% CI

.99
.97-1.00
.63
.46-.86
.64
.32-1.28
4.16 1.04-16.62
.28
.10-.81
.35
.14-.85
2.59 1.00-6.73

.99
.98-1.00
1.00 .76-1.31
.56
.31-1.03
.77
.34-1.75
.48
.19-1.27
1.00 .43-2.33
4.61 1.95-10.88

1.01
1.59
.87
.186
1.71
2.90
1.78

.99-1.02
1.22-2.08
.49-1.53
.05-.67
.79-3.69
1.39-6.05
.69-4.58

Knowledge Attribution Post-Test
To determine if children changed their knowledge attribution for the inaccurate
expert and the control expert, two chi-squared tests were conducted to compare changers
vs non-changers against chance value (n=40). For the inaccurate expert’s domain of
expertise, children were categorized as changers if they selected the control expert as

33

knowing more about the inaccurate expert’s domain of expertise. For the control expert’s
domain of expertise, children were categorized as changers if they selected the inaccurate
expert as knowing more about the control expert’s domain of expertise. The chi-squared
test for the inaccurate expert’s domain of expertise showed that the number of children
who changed and did not change did not differ from chance, χ2(1) = 0.45, p = .502. The
chi-squared test for the control expert’s domain of expertise showed that the number of
children who changed and did not change differed from chance, χ2(1) = 68.45, p < .001
(see Table 7). These results suggest that the majority of children continued to attribute
knowledge to the control expert for his domain of knowledge. However, this pattern was
not the same for the inaccurate expert, such that around half of the participants (i.e.,
chance) said the control expert would know about the inaccurate expert’s domain of
knowledge.
Table 7
Children’s Change in Knowledge Attribution at Post-Test by Each Expert’s Relevant
Domain of Expertise for Study 1

Expert’s Domain

Knowledge Attribution
No Change
Change
43
37
77
3

Inaccurate
Control

Predictors of Change in Knowledge Attribution Post-Test
To understand why almost half of the participants changed their knowledge
attribution at post-test, a logistic regression (see Table 8) was conducted to investigate the
relation between children’s knowledge attribution at post-test (i.e., changed = 1, or not
changed = 0) and Age (continuous), condition, square root transformed (SQRT) final
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knowledge rating3, and the total production of each explanation (i.e., General Trait
Negative, Trial Specific Excuse, Statement Focused Endorsement, and Statement
Focused Rejection). The model was statistically significant, χ2 (7, N = 804) = 38.24, p <
.001, suggesting that the model distinguished between those who had changed their
knowledge attribution and those who had not. In addition, Nagelkerke R2 was .527,
suggesting that the model accounted for 52.7% of variance. The model was able to
correctly identify 78.8% of the cases. Square root transformed final knowledge rating was
a significant predictor of change in knowledge attribution (p < .001, odds ratio = .07).
This finding suggests that when children gave the inaccurate expert higher knowledge
ratings at Time 5, they were less likely to change their knowledge attribution at post-test.
All other variables were non-significant; they did not predict children’s change in
knowledge attribution.

3

Based on Kim (2013): Due to an absolute skewness z-score = 3.32 (i.e., > 3.29), final knowledge rating
scores were transformed using a square-root transformation (for "moderate" positive skewness; Howell,
2013) resulting in an absolute skewness z-score = 2.53.
4
One 6-year-old had a Cook’s absolute value = 1.24. Removing that participant did not change the overall
pattern of results, therefore they were included in the reported analysis.
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Table 8
Logistic Regression Results Predicting Children’s Knowledge Attribution of the
Inaccurate Expert’s Domain at Post-Test in Study 1 (N = 80)
Variable

B

SE

Wald

p

OR

Model 1 (constant)

.79

2.77

.08

.774

2.21

Age (continuous)

.37

.30

1.54

.215

1.45 .81-2.61

.05
-2.72

.65
.69

.01
15.56

.944
< .001

1.05 .30-3.71
.07 .02-.25

General Trait Negative

.06

.27

.04

.837

1.06 .62-1.80

Trial Specific Excuse

-.39

.29

1.73

.189

.68

Statement Focused Endorsement

.06

.29

.04

.840

1.06 .61-1.85

Statement Focused Rejection
.09
Note. OR, odds ratio; CI, confidence interval.

.33

.08

.778

1.10 .58-2.07

Condition
SQRT Final Knowledge Rating

95% CI

.38-1.21

Discussion
Study 1 examined developmental differences in children’s judgments of experts
after the experts provided inaccurate information. Although children were accurate at
attributing relevant knowledge to the relevant expert before receiving any information
about the expert’s inaccuracy, around half of the children changed their response
regarding who knows more about the inaccurate expert’s domain of knowledge to say
that the control expert would know more after receiving information about the expert’s
inaccuracy. Also, children rated experts as having a high amount of knowledge in their
relevant domains before observing any inaccurate information. Then, as children were
given more information about an expert’s inaccuracy, children decreased their knowledge
rating of the inaccurate expert over time regardless of age and condition.
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Although grouping the children into younger and older age groups may have
made it more difficult to detect age related effects (Lazic, 2008), when age was examined
continuously in the regression analyses, there was a negative relationship between age
and knowledge ratings. This suggests that older children were more likely to provide
lower knowledge ratings than younger children. This pattern of results is consistent with
the prediction that the positivity bias may play a role in children’s judgments of the
inaccurate expert and that younger children are more likely to pay attention to and
process information selectively to have a positive view of themselves and/or others than
older children (see Boseovski, 2010, for a review). Younger children in the current study
showed a positivity bias towards the inaccurate expert, such that they did not rate him as
having a low amount of knowledge – a negatively valenced trait.
One potential limitation of Study 1 is that children decreased their knowledge
rating of the expert because of a task demand. Developmental research suggests that
when they are asked the same question multiple times, children will change their answer
every time due to the nature of repeated questioning (Poole & White, 1991). However,
because children decreased their knowledge rating for the inaccurate expert in a linear
trend (i.e., not randomly) and children gave consistent knowledge ratings to the control
expert over time, children’s change in knowledge ratings for the inaccurate expert
appears to have been due to the manipulation (i.e., the inaccurate information provided).
Children’s explanations for why the expert provided the inaccurate information
also predicted their knowledge ratings. Children across both age groups produced Expert
Focused explanations at similar rates. However, younger children were more likely than
older children to produce Statement Focused explanations. This is consistent with
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previous research that suggests younger children typically do not spontaneously describe
people using traits and they rarely assume traits from behavioral evidence (e.g., Rholes &
Ruble, 1984; Yuill & Pearson 1998). It is possible that the younger children in the current
study were more likely to comment on the information provided rather than the person
because younger children typically do not make trait labels in general.
More specifically, younger children seemed to make more Statement Focused
Rejections (e.g., said the statement was wrong). It is possible that younger children were
more focused on the content that was being said than the characteristics of the informant
who provided them. One explanation for this result could be that children in the current
study did not hear any conflicting testimony from a second informant. In a typical trust
paradigm, two informants provide conflicting claims and children must choose which
information or informant to endorse (see Tong et al., 2020 for review). However, children
do not typically hear conflicting testimonies in their everyday life. Presenting a single
informant has good ecological validity, but it may make it more difficult to discern
differences in how children treat different types of informants and what informant
characteristics they notice or prioritize (see Danovitch & Lane, 2020). Because children
did not hear a conflicting statement by the control expert, the informant’s characteristics
may not have been as salient to them as the content of the inaccurate answer. Future
research should examine whether children are more likely to produce the same
explanations when presented with conflicting testimonies by two experts.
Children who produced a Statement Focused Endorsement explanation (e.g., said
the statement was right) were more likely than children who did not produce this kind of
explanation to give higher knowledge ratings to the inaccurate expert. It is possible that
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children who endorsed the claim also believed that the expert who produced it was
knowledgeable. Prior research has shown that children who endorse statements from one
expert prefer to seek out new information or ask about new information from that same
expert (Jaswal et al., 2010; Landrum et al., 2013). Thus, children’s endorsement of the
statement may have meant that they also believed the expert still knew about information
in his relevant domain.
Among children who produced Expert Focused explanations, children who
produced a General Trait Negative explanation about the expert (e.g., “the expert is not
smart”) were more likely than children who did not produce this type of explanation to
give a lower knowledge rating to the inaccurate expert. This result is consistent with
some trait labeling research, such that, when an individual has shown a negative trait
behavior in the past (e.g., not generous), elementary age children predict that the
individual will act in a consistent way in the future (Kalish, 2002, Experiment 2).
Children in this study demonstrated this pattern of thinking when they said the expert was
not smart and they also rated him as not knowing anything. Also, in previous research
when an expert displayed knowledge in a specific domain (e.g., dogs), children did not
expect the expert to know more about an unrelated domain (e.g., artifacts) more than a
neutral person (Koenig & Jaswal, 2011). However, when an expert was described as
incompetent about a specific domain (e.g., dogs), children showed a preference for a
neutral informant for the specific domain and the unrelated domain. Koenig and Jaswal
(2011) claimed that when evaluating children’s judgments of individual’s knowledge,
there is no “halo effect” when a person is knowledgeable (knowing about one thing does
not mean you are knowledgeable about another thing). Interestingly, they found a
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“pitchfork effect” when an informant is incompetent (not knowing about one thing means
you are not knowledgeable about another thing). Some children in the current study may
have displayed this pitchfork effect such that they said the expert must not know about
the topic at all or is not smart after hearing an inaccurate answer.
One assumption of regression analysis is that the dependent variable must be
normally distributed (Howell, 2013). Therefore, a limitation of Study 1 is that, due to
non-normal distributions and the inclusion of transformed variables, caution must be used
during the interpretation of the results predicting children’s knowledge ratings for the
inaccurate expert. Non-normal distributions are extremely common, especially when
measuring human behavior (Field, 2018), therefore researchers have developed ways to
work around this common problem. In the current study, the overall distribution of
children’s knowledge ratings (i.e., the dependent variable) had a bimodal distribution,
therefore an exploratory analysis was conducted where children were split into 3
categories of responders, “Never Drop”, “Fast Drop”, and “Slow Drop.” Children were
more likely to be categorized as a “Never Drop” relative to a “Slow Drop” if they were
younger, did not produce a general trait negative explanation, and if they did produce a
trial specific excuse and statement focused endorsements. Children were more likely to
be categorized as a “Fast Drop” relative to a “Slow Drop” if they did not produce a
statement focused rejection explanation. Lastly, children were more likely to be
categorized as a “Fast Drop” relative to a “Never Drop” if they were older, did produce a
general trait negative explanation, and if they did not produce a statement focused
endorsement.
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One explanation for these results could come from trait labeling research, such
that younger children are less likely than older children to judge someone consistently
with a past behavior (Rholes and Ruble, 1984). In the current study, older children were
more likely to drop their knowledge ratings than younger children. After hearing the
inaccurate information (i.e., past behavior), older children made more consistent
judgments about the expert (i.e., he doesn’t know anything) than younger children. Also,
previous research has shown that young children need multiple pieces of information to
make consistent judgments about an individual (Aloise, 1993; Boseovski & Lee, 2006). It
is possible that the younger children in the current study were more likely to be
categorized as “Never Drop” because they needed more pieces of information than 4
inaccurate responses. Future research should consider extending the study with more
inaccurate trials to examine if the amount of information children are given influences
their judgments.
Lastly, children made knowledge attributions for both the inaccurate and control
expert at the end of the study. Around half of the participants (46%) said the control
expert knew more about the inaccurate expert’s domain of knowledge. When examining
what predicted this response, only children’s final knowledge rating for the inaccurate
expert was a significant predictor. Children who gave lower knowledge ratings at time 5
were more likely to change their knowledge attribution than children who gave higher
knowledge ratings at time 5. Given that children are less likely to choose an inaccurate
informant to answer a question than an accurate or neutral informant (e.g., Corriveau &
Harris, 2009b; Pasquini et al., 2007), it would be expected that all children would say the
control expert knows more regardless of the topic. However, there is some debate about
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whether children believe an expert’s knowledge to be domain-general or domain-specific
(e.g., Koenig & Jaswal, 2011; Taylor et. al., 1994). When evaluating the epistemic
characteristics of expertise and inaccuracy, there might be individual differences that
cause some children to believe the control expert would know more than the inaccurate
expert in the inaccurate expert’s domain of knowledge. Further research should examine
children’s judgments of an expert’s knowledge as either domain-general or domainspecific and how that relates to how children attribute knowledge to different experts.
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CHAPTER III
STUDY 2
In recent psychological research, there has been a push for evidence of replication
(Duncan et al., 2014). Therefore, Study 2 was designed to replicate and extend the
findings of Study 1. Study 2 included the same methods as Study 1, with the addition of a
new question delegation task and an update to the previously used Explanation prompts.
The first aim of Study 2 was to better understand children’s explanations based on
the results collected in Study 1. In Study 2, children completed the same task as in Study
1; however, instead of receiving an open-ended question about why they believed the
expert said the inaccurate information, children were given a forced-choice between the
top 2 most frequently produced explanations across subcategories. This forced-choice
format allowed for a more precise measure of children’s explanations and avoided “I
don’t know” and no answer responses.
The second aim of Study 2 was to build on the results of Study 1 to better
understand children’s beliefs about the inaccurate informant. Although children in Study
1 gave a lower knowledge rating for the inaccurate expert after the 4 inaccuracy trials and
some children believed the control expert had more knowledge in the inaccurate expert’s
domain of expertise, it is unclear how children would interact further with both
informants when given a task to complete that requires expert help. In a series of control
experiments used to further understand the results of conformity from the popular Ashe
test, it was proposed that individuals were simply changing their public pronouncements
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but not their beliefs (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). Rakoczy et al. (2015) further examined
this idea when measuring children’s selective advice taking. In this study, the researchers
were interested in looking beyond children’s preferences and understanding if children
would update their beliefs when receiving advice from a knowledgeable or ignorant
informant. The results showed that 3- to 6-year-olds preferred the knowledgeable
informant more often than the ignorant one, and children were more likely to take advice
and update their beliefs from the knowledgeable informant. However, when comparing
children’s belief updating to chance, children seemed to take advice from both informants
above chance levels. Similar results were shown in Hermansen et. al. (2021) such that
children as young as 4- and 5-years-old detected an expert’s inaccuracy and then
transferred this belief about the informant’s reliability from one task to another. However,
the rates at which children rejected the expert’s claim for children who interacted with an
inaccurate expert did not differ from chance. This finding suggests that there may be
variability in children’s belief updating when making judgments about an inaccurate
expert’s claims. It is possible that although children pronounce a preference for one
expert over the other, they might not drastically change their beliefs when completing a
task that requires domain specific expertise.
Study 2 included a Question Delegation task, similar to the one used in Danovitch
et al. (2019; modelled after Lutz & Keil, 2002 and Aguiar et al., 2012). Although children
may say that they prefer the control expert over the inaccurate expert on the Knowledge
Attribution post-test for both domains of knowledge, it is possible that when tasked with
winning a question game, children would still want to seek out answers from the expert in
the relevant domain. In Rakoczy et al.’s (2015) study, age significantly predicted advice
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taking, suggesting older children were more likely to take advice than younger children.
Also, children were asked to rate their own competence as well as the knowledgeable and
ignorant informant’s competence. Results showed that children did not rate themselves as
more or less competent than the knowledgeable informant; however, children did rate
themselves as more competent than the ignorant informant.
In the Question Delegation task, children had the opportunity to assign questions
about bodies and cars to the doctor and mechanic expert or choose to answer the question
themselves. The results of Study 2 reveal how children think about themselves as sources
of information compared to an inaccurate expert and an expert with irrelevant expertise.
Children as young as 5-years-old have difficulty judging their own knowledge and
assume they have more knowledge than they do (Mills & Keil, 2004). However, by
second grade, children are more aware of the limitations of their knowledge. Also, in a
recent study by Baer and Odic (2022), children ages 4- to 9 had to delegate questions to
either a peer that was “better” or “not as good” (Exp 1) or “younger” or “older” (Exp 2)
than them on a set of number problems. Results showed that children’s delegations were
consistent with the law of comparative advantage (i.e., assigning questions to self and
another based on the other’s and self’s ability). In this study, children were more likely to
delegate the harder question to their partner when their partner was more skilled or older
than them than when their partner was not as good or younger than them (Baer & Odic,
2022). Importantly, this effect was moderated by age such that older children (i.e., 9year-olds in Exp 1 and 7-year-olds and older in Exp 2) were more likely to demonstrate
this strategy than younger children. Younger children were more likely to demonstrate a
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self-serving bias, such that they delegated easier questions to themselves more often than
older children.
Previous research using the Question Delegation task has found that children ages
6-8 assign more questions to experts than themselves (Danovitch et al., 2019). However,
in previous work, there was no history of inaccuracy for either expert. Because children
in Danovitch et al. (2019) preferred to assign questions to experts rather than themselves,
I predicted that children would assign most questions to the control expert, regardless of
question domain. Also, previous research has shown that children will not assign
questions to a relevant expert when doing so comes at a cost (e.g., time and effort;
Rowles & Mills, 2019). In my study, because the inaccurate expert has demonstrated that
they answer questions incorrectly, choosing him to answer questions might cause
children to lose the game. Therefore I predicted children would assign questions to the
other expert. Lastly, because younger children struggle to understand their own
knowledge levels when asked about difficult or complex questions (see Mills & Keil,
2004), I expected younger children to select themselves to answer questions in the
inaccurate expert’s domain more often than older children.
Methods
Participants
Because one of the aims of Study 2 was to replicate the findings from Study 1, 80
participants were included. Children were recruited using the same methods as Study 1
and the same exclusion criteria was applied. Participants included 40 6- to 7-year-olds
(19 males, 21 females; Mage = 7.05, SD = .10) and 40 8- to 9-year-olds (21 males,19
females; Mage = 9.06, SD = .10). Four additional participants were excluded from
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analyses. Two 6-year-olds failed the practice questions, one 7-year-old had completed
Study 1, and one 9-year-old had a faulty audio connection and was unable to answer the
questions.
Of the 80 participants, 71% of parents identified their child as White/Caucasian,
11% identified as Asian, 5% participant identified as Black/African-American, and 11%
identified as belonging to 2 or more races, and 1% did not provide race information.
Eighty-six percent of parents identified their child as Not Hispanic or Latino, 11%
participants identified as Hispanic or Latino, and the other 3% participants did not
answer.
Materials and Procedures
Counting Check
Same as Study 1.
Scale Training
Same as Study 1.
Expert Introduction
Same as Study 1.
Knowledge Attribution Pre-test
Same as Study 1.
Pre-test Knowledge Judgment
Same as Study 1.
Inaccuracy Trial with Answer Explanations and Knowledge Ratings
Same as Study 1 except that instead of asking an open-ended question, children
were presented with a forced-choice option between two explanations. The two most
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frequently produced explanations from Study 1 that also significantly predicted children’s
knowledge ratings were General Trait Negative and Statement Focused Endorse. These
two explanations were used in the forced-choice explanation questions in Study 2. After
each inaccurate answer, the experimenter asked the participant why they thought the
expert said that answer and provided a choice between generic examples of the two
explanation types (i.e., “because he does not know about bodies/cars” or “because [repeat
inaccurate expert’s answer]”).
Knowledge Attribution Post-Test
Same as Study 1.
Question Delegation Task
The Question Delegation Task consisted of 10 questions (5 biological and 5
mechanical). The 10 questions were selected based on their mean difficulty based on
adult ratings. Eight adults read 19 biological and 11 mechanical questions and rated how
difficult each question would be for them to correctly answer using a 5-point scale (1 =
easy and 5 = hard). Mean scores for each of the 30 questions ranged from 1 to 5, and the
10 questions included for this study all scored above a 3.8 (see Appendix D for questions
with means and standard deviations). Harder questions were selected rather than easy
ones because previous research has found that children ages 5- to 9-years-old generally
choose to answer easier questions themselves if they believe they will answer correctly
(Baer et al., 2021; Baer & Odic, 2019). Because one of the aims of Study 2 was to see
how children delegate questions that require expertise to answer, the Question Delegation
Task was developed to include questions that would be hard for children to answer. The
ten questions were also piloted with 9 children (6 males, 3 females; Mage = 7.10, SD =
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1.02) to check that they could correctly assign the appropriate expert to each question.
Overall, in the pilot study, children assigned 96% of the questions to the correct relevant
expert (i.e., the doctor to biology questions and the mechanic to mechanical questions).
For this task, the experimenter instructed participants that they were going to play
a question game and the game was to see how many questions their team could get right.
The experimenter revealed images of the same doctor and mechanic as in the earlier tasks
with the words “Your Team” written at the top of the slide. To make sure children
understood that the men on the screen were the same doctor and mechanic, the
experimenter said “Do you remember these guys? This is the same doctor and the same
mechanic you saw before. This is your team. Your team is this doctor, this mechanic, and
yourself.” Participants were told that every time their team got a question right, they
would get a point and that first they needed to decide who would answer each question
during the game. They were told that they could keep some questions for themselves to
answer but if they did not know the right answer, they could ask one of their teammates
to answer it. The experimenter ended the introduction to the game by saying “Choose the
teammate you think will get the right answer.” The introduction for the Question
Delegation Task was modified from Danovitch et al. (2019).
Children heard each question as the question was displayed on the screen above
the experts and were asked who could answer that question (e.g., “Which part of the body
grows the fastest? Who will answer that question? This doctor, this mechanic, or you”).
Questions were asked in 1 of 2 fixed random orders where the same type of question (i.e.,
biological or mechanical) did not occur more than twice in a row.
Recognition Check
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To check that the participants remembered that the expert in the Question
Delegation Task was the same inaccurate expert as before, the experimenter showed the
picture of the inaccurate expert on the screen and asked: “Is this the same
doctor/mechanic that you heard answer questions at the beginning of the study, and you
rated how much he knew?” If the child said “No”, they were asked to explain why they
said it was not the same person.
Question Delegation Justification
To understand why participants picked the inaccurate expert in the Question
Delegation Task after rating him as having low or no knowledge, the experimenter asked,
“I saw that you picked him [the inaccurate expert] to answer some of the questions in the
question game, why did you pick him sometimes?” This question was only asked of
participants who picked the inaccurate expert at least once during the Question
Delegation Task.
Justification Coding
Children’s responses to the Question Delegation Justification question were
transcribed and coded by two independent coders, blind to participants’ age. The coding
scheme classified children’s justifications for why they picked the inaccurate expert
based on 4 non-exclusive components: 1) justifications focused on the inaccurate expert
as having knowledge or referring to the expertise label (e.g., “He knows about bodies” or
“He's a doctor”), 2) justifications focused on the control expert not having knowledge
(e.g., “I didn't think the mechanic would know”), 3) justifications focused on themselves
not having knowledge (“I didn’t know [the answer]”), and 4) justifications referring to
the question type (e.g., “They were doctor/body questions” or “they were mechanic/car
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questions”). Responses that did not include one or more of the above codes were coded as
miscellaneous (e.g., “Cause he’s funny”).
Results
Knowledge Attribution Pre-Test
All participants attributed biological knowledge to the doctor. All but one 6-yearold attributed mechanical knowledge to the mechanic5.
Change in Knowledge Rating
Preliminary analyses revealed no effects of gender or trial order, so these
variables were excluded from further analyses.
A 2 (age group: younger or older) x 2 (condition: doctor or mechanic) x 5 (time:
1, 2, 3, 4, & 5) factorial ANOVA examining change in rating for the inaccurate expert
resulted in a significant value for Mauchly's Test of Sphericity, therefore Greenhouse Geiser corrections are reported for the following results. There was a significant main
effect of time, F(2.25, 170.73) = 386.70, p < .001, η2 = .836. Post-hoc pairwise
comparisons with Bonferroni correction (critical p = .005 for 10 comparisons) for each
time point resulted in all significant differences, ps < .003, expect for time 3 to time 4, p
= .008, and time 4 to time 5, p = .874, suggesting that participants decreased their
knowledge ratings at each interval from time 1 to time 3 and then leveled off after time 3.
There was also a main effect of condition, F(1, 76) = 4.10, p = .046, η2 = .051, such that
participants who heard inaccurate answers from the mechanic gave higher ratings overall
than participants who heard inaccurate answers from the doctor. There was no significant

5

To be consistent with Study 1, this participant was included in the following analyses. Removing this
participant changes the results slightly, such that the main effect of condition in change in knowledge
ratings is no longer significant, F(1, 75) = 3.52, p = .064. All other patterns of results do not change.
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main effect of age, F < 2.41, p = .125. There were also no significant interactions, Fs <
1.80, ps > .164. Although the linear trend contrast was significant, p < .001, when
observing the shape of the data, it is more likely a logarithmic trend such that children
decreased their knowledge ratings for the inaccurate expert but leveled off as he provided
more inaccurate information (see Figure 5).
Figure 5
Children’s Average Knowledge Ratings Over 5 Time Points for the Inaccurate Expert by
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A Mixed Repeated Measures ANOVA using the ratings for the control expert as
the dependent variables resulted in a significant main effect of knowledge rating, F(2.38,
181.15) = 3.61, p = .022, η2 = .045 (see Figure 6). However, post-hoc pairwise
comparisons with Bonferroni corrections for each time point resulted in no significant
differences, ps > .070, suggesting that participants’ knowledge ratings for the control
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expert did not significantly differ between time points. Also, there were no other
significant main effects or interactions, Fs < 3.20, ps > 0.77.
Figure 6
Children’s Average Knowledge Ratings Over 5 Time Points for the Control Expert by
Age Group and Condition for Study 2.
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Answer Explanations
Across all 4 trials, children selected the General Trait Negative explanations 93%
of the time (see Table 9 for breakdown by age group and condition). Thus, when
providing participants with a forced-choice option, participants indicated that the expert
did not know about his domain of expertise (i.e., bodies or cars) rather than endorse the
inaccurate statement.
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Table 9
Frequency of Explanation Choice by Age Group and Condition for Study 2

Younger
Older

Doctor
Mechanic
Doctor
Mechanic

Explanation Type
General Trait Negative
Statement Focused
Endorsement
77 (96%)
3 (4%)
78 (97%)
2 (3%)
68 (85%)
12 (15%)
76 (95%)
4 (5%)

Prediction of Change in Knowledge Rating
Due to the non-linear distribution of the data, it was not appropriate to conduct a
linear regression as in Study 1. Informal observation revealed that of the 7% of Answer
Explanations that were Statement Focused, the average knowledge rating across trials
was 6.14 (SD = 1.65). In comparison, the average knowledge rating for the trials where
children chose the General Trait Negative explanations was 1.41 (SD = 1.05). This
finding suggests that children who selected the Statement Focused explanation rated the
inaccurate expert as having knowledge and children who selected the General Trait
Negative explanation rated the inaccurate expert as not having knowledge.
Also, of the 21 trials in which children chose the Statement Focused Endorsement
explanations, 13 occurred on the first trial, 5 occurred on the second trial, 2 occurred on
the third trial, and only 1 occurred on the fourth trial (with this participant choosing the
Statement Focused Endorsement explanations on every trial). Statement Focused
Endorsement explanations were more likely to be selected on earlier trials than later
trials, where children had less experience with the informant’s inaccuracy, and they were
more likely to be followed by a higher knowledge rating than a lower knowledge rating.
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Participants selected the General Trait Negative explanation and gave lower knowledge
ratings regardless of trial.
Exploratory Analysis of Knowledge Rating
The same categorization scheme used for the exploratory analysis in Study 1 was
used for the data in Study 2 (see Table 10 for breakdown by age group). However,
because 83% of children were in the “fast drop” category, and the number of children in
the other categories was very small, the exploratory analysis computed in Study 1 was
not appropriate for Study 2.
Table 10
Frequency of Participant in Each Type of Rater Response by Age Group in Study 2

Age Group
Younger
Older

Never Drop
3
0

Category of Rater Response
Fast Drop
32
34

Slow Drop
5
6

Knowledge Attribution Post-Test
To determine if children changed their knowledge attribution for the inaccurate
expert and the control expert, two chi-squared tests were conducted to compare
“changers” vs “non-changers” against the expected value (n=40). The chi-squared test for
the inaccurate expert’s domain of expertise showed that the number of children who
changed and did not change did not differ from chance, χ2(1) = 1.25, p = .264, suggesting
that around half the participants (i.e., chance) said the control expert would know about
the inaccurate expert’s domain of knowledge. The chi-squared test for the control
expert’s domain of expertise showed that the proportion of children who changed and did
not change significantly differed from chance, χ2(1) = 61.25, p < .001 (see Table 11),
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demonstrating that the majority of children continued to attribute knowledge to the
control expert for his domain of knowledge.
Table 11
Children’s Change in Knowledge Attribution by Each Expert’s Relevant Domain of
Expertise for Study 2

Expert’s Domain

Knowledge Attribution
No Change
Change
35
45
75
5

Inaccurate
Control

Predictions of Change in Knowledge Attribution.
To understand why almost half of the participants changed their knowledge
attribution at post-test, a logistic regression (see Table 12) was conducted to investigate
the relation between children’s knowledge attribution at post-test (i.e., changed = 1, or
not changed = 0), Age (continuous), and condition. Due to a skewness score of 13.07 for
final knowledge rating, an Inverse Transformation for "severe" positive skewness was
conducted and resulted in a skewness score of 8.22. Because the skewness of the new
transformed variable was still above 3.29, this variable was excluded from the logistic
regression. Also, due to the low frequency of Statement Focused Endorsement
explanations, the selection of each type of explanation was excluded from the analysis.
The model was statistically significant, χ2 (2, N = 80) = 17.16, p < .001,
suggesting that it distinguished between participants who had changed their knowledge
attribution and participants who had not. In addition, 25.9% of the variance was
accounted for (Nagelkerke R2 = .259), and the model was able to correctly identify 68.8%
of the cases. Age (continuous) was a significant predictor of change in knowledge
attribution (p < .001, odds ratio = 2.26), indicating that as age increases by a factor of 1
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year, children’s odds of changing their knowledge attribution at post-test increases by a
factor of 2.26. This finding suggests that older children were more likely to change their
knowledge attribution at post-test than younger children. The effect of condition was
non-significant; therefore, whether the inaccurate expert was a doctor or a mechanic did
not affect children’s knowledge attributions at post-test.
Table 12
Logistic Regression Results Predicting Children’s Knowledge Attribution of the
Inaccurate Expert’s Domain at Post-Test in Study 2 (N = 80)
Variable
Model 1
(constant)
Age
(continuous)
Condition

Nagelkerke
R2

χ2

B

SE

Wald

p

OR

.259

17.16

-5.10

1.96

6.80

.009

.01

.81

.23

12.12

<.001

2.26

1.43-3.57

-.77

.51

2.30

.130

.46

.17-1.25

95% CI

Note. OR, odds ratio; CI, confidence interval.
Question Delegation Analysis
For questions in the inaccurate expert’s domain of knowledge, children chose the
inaccurate expert to answer the questions 77% of the time, the control expert 9% of the
time, and themselves 14% of the time (see Table 13). For questions in the control
expert’s domain of knowledge, children chose the inaccurate expert to answer the
questions 4% of the time, the control expert 87% of the time, and themselves 9% of the
time (see Table 14).
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Table 13
Frequency of Assignment of Inaccurate Expert’s Question Type (x5) in the Question
Delegation Task by Age Group and Condition

Younger
Older

Doctor
Mechanic
Doctor
Mechanic

Inaccurate Expert’s Domain Questions
Inaccurate
Control
Self
74
5
21
80
7
13
75
17
8
77
8
15

Table 14
Frequency of Assignment of Control Expert’s Question Type (x5) in the Question
Delegation Task by Age Group and Condition

Younger
Older

Doctor
Mechanic
Doctor
Mechanic

Control Expert’s Domain Questions
Inaccurate
Control
Self
0
93
7
1
84
15
9
84
7
6
87
7

Excluding the trials where children selected themselves, a chi-squared goodnessof-fit test was conducted to determine if there was a difference in frequency between the
number of questions assigned to the inaccurate expert for questions within the inaccurate
expert’s domain and the number of questions assigned to the control expert for questions
within the control expert’s domain. This analysis resulted in a significant difference, χ2(1)
= 4.69, p = .030, suggesting that children assigned more questions to the control expert
for questions within the control expert’s domain than questions to the inaccurate expert
for questions within the inaccurate expert’s domain.
A paired samples t-test was conducted to determine if participants assigned more
questions to themselves for the inaccurate expert’s domain of knowledge questions than
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the control expert’s domain of knowledge questions. This resulted in a significant
difference, t(79) = 2.03, p = .046, such that children assigned more questions to
themselves for the inaccurate expert’s domain questions (M = .71, SD = 1.09) than the
control expert’s domain questions (M = .45, SD = .59).
Justification Coding.
Of the 80 participants, 7 participants were included in an initial version of the
study and were not asked the Question Delegation justification (i.e., “Why did you pick
him [the inaccurate expert] sometimes?”), 4 participants never selected the inaccurate
expert in the Question Delegation task (which resulted in this question being irrelevant),
and 1 participant’s answer was not recorded. Therefore, 68 participants’ answers were
transcribed. Two independent coders, blind to the participant’s age, coded 38% (n=26) of
the justifications. Overall percent agreement was 93.59% and there was very high
interrater reliability (Cohen’s κ = .82). Disagreements were resolved through discussion.
Each coder then coded 31% (n=21) of the sample on their own. One participant
responded, “I don’t know” and therefore was coded as such. Table 15 displays the
frequency of each code provided by participants within each age group.
As can be seen in Table 15, older children were more likely than younger children
to provide justifications that refer to their own lack of knowledge. However, children in
each age group gave other justifications (i.e., referring to expertise or the expert has
knowledge, referring to the control expert not having knowledge, and referring to the
specific question asked) at similar rates.
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Table 15
Frequency of Justification Codes for Question Delegation Justifications in Study 2
Age Group
Justification code
6- & 7-year-olds 8- & 9-year-olds
(n = 35)
(n = 33)
Expertise/Inaccurate Expert Has Knowledge
18 (51.4%)
16 (48.5%)
Control Expert Does Not Have Knowledge
7 (20%)
7 (21.2%)
Self Does Not Have Knowledge
6 (17.1%)
12 (36.4%)
Question Type
13 (37.1%)
10 (30.3%)
Note. Justifications were not mutually exclusive; therefore, totals are more than 100%.
Predictors of Question Delegation
For the question delegation task, children were categorized into 4 different types
of responders: 1) Inaccurate Preference (i.e., children who assigned the majority of
inaccurate expert’s domain questions to the inaccurate expert), 2) Self Preference (i.e.,
children who assigned the majority of inaccurate expert’s domain questions to
themselves), 3) Control Preference (i.e., children who assigned the majority of the
inaccurate expert’s domain questions to the control expert), and 4) Mixed Preference (i.e.,
children who assigned the majority of inaccurate expert’s domain questions to both
themselves and the control expert). Eighty-three percent of children were categorized as
having an Inaccurate Preference, 1% as Self Preference, 2% as Control Preference, and
1% as Mixed Preference (see Table 16). Because of the lack of variability in the types of
responders, formal analyses could not be conducted.
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Table 16
Frequency of Type of Responder for Question Delegation Task by Age Group and
Condition

Younger
Older

Doctor
Mechanic
Doctor
Mechanic

Type of Responder
Self
Control
Preference
Preference
2
0
1
1
0
4
1
1

Inaccurate
Preference
17
17
16
16

Mixed
Preference
1
1
0
2

Discussion
The overall patterns of results from Study 1 were replicated in Study 2.
Specifically, children decreased their knowledge rating of the inaccurate expert over time
and about half the children said that the control expert knew more about the inaccurate
expert’s domain of knowledge than the inaccurate expert.
Although the overall patterns of results for the main task were replicated, when
observing the results more closely, there are some distinct differences between Study 1
and Study 2. First, although children decreased their knowledge ratings of the inaccurate
expert over time, the ratings reached floor levels more quickly in Study 2 than in Study 1.
One explanation for this difference could be that Study 2 included forced-choice options
that were not present in Study 1. When examining the two forced-choice explanations
(i.e., General Trait Negative and Statement Focused Endorsement), children rarely chose
the Statement Focused Endorsement explanation. Selecting the General Trait Negative
explanation (i.e., “he does not know about X”) could have influenced children’s ratings
by prompting them to acknowledge that the expert might not have a high amount of
knowledge. The results of Study 1 support this proposal, such that children who provided
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General Trait Negative explanations also rated the expert as having lower knowledge.
Children’s preference for General Trait Negative explanations makes sense given that
previous research has shown children rarely endorse inaccurate information when given a
forced-choice response (see Birch et al., 2008; Harris & Corriveau, 2011; Pasquini et al.,
2007; Vanderbilt et al., 2014). This result suggests that even though children recognize
and understand expertise, they are heavily swayed by an expert’s inaccuracy and when
given the option to not endorse the inaccurate information, they rarely do so.
Also, in Study 2 there was a main effect of condition, such that children were
more likely to give a lower knowledge rating to the inaccurate doctor than to the
inaccurate mechanic. This effect of condition could suggest that children judge different
experts more or less harshly based on the domain of their knowledge. Practically, if a
doctor makes a mistake in real life, it is more likely to cost someone their health/life than
if a mechanic makes a mistake. Also, although children are equally familiar with a doctor
and a mechanic as examples of experts (Lutz & Keil, 2002), children may interact more
often and more personally with a doctor than a mechanic. Because children have more
experience with doctors in their own lives who are presumably accurate, children may be
more judgmental of an inaccurate doctor than an inaccurate mechanic.
One surprising result in Study 2 was that there was a statistically significant
difference in knowledge rating for the control expert over time. One explanation for this
result is that because children made more negative ratings of the inaccurate expert, they
also decreased their ratings slightly for the other expert. However, although this result is
“statistically significant” (i.e., p < .05), it could be argued that it is not meaningful
because of the small effect size (η2 = .045). Over the past decade, scientists and
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academics have suggested that effect sizes may be more meaningful than p-values
(Sullivan & Feinn, 2012). The lack of significance when using a more precise analysis
(i.e., post-hoc analysis with Bonferroni correction) further supports this explanation, such
that none of the ratings were significantly different from each other at different time
points.
Due to the lower ratings of the inaccurate expert and the low amount of variability
between explanation types, the regression analyses performed in Study 1 were not able to
be repeated in Study 2. Observationally, Statement Focused Endorsement explanations
were selected by children during earlier trials and followed higher knowledge ratings.
However, children selected General Trait Negative explanations the majority of the time
and provided lower ratings for the inaccurate expert. This pattern of responses is
consistent with research on the positivity bias: as children receive more negative
observations, they are more likely to attribute a negative trait label than a positive or
neutral trait label (Boseovski & Lee, 2006).
Finally, Study 2 replicated the finding from Study 1 in that around half the
children selected the control expert as knowing more about the inaccurate expert’s
domain of knowledge. Due to skewed final knowledge ratings, this variable was not able
to be included as a predictor for children’s change in ratings. However, age predicted
whether children selected the inaccurate expert or the control expert as knowing more
about the inaccurate expert’s domain of knowledge. Older children were more likely than
younger children to say the control expert knew more about the inaccurate expert’s
domain of knowledge. This developmental difference is similar to findings in selective
trust research involving experts who provide statements that are counter-intuitive (Lane
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& Harris, 2015) or conflict with a consensus (Boseovski et al., 2017). In both of these
studies, older children were less likely to endorse an expert’s claim that was counterintuitive or against consensus than younger children. Older children may be more
sensitive to the information provided to them than younger children. Consequently, in the
current study, older children may have been more likely to choose the control expert as
knowing more about the inaccurate expert’s domain of knowledge. Another explanation
for this finding is that older children are more sensitive to inaccuracy than younger
children. Previous research on inaccurate informants has found that by age 7, children
only need one inaccurate answer from an informant to decide whether to trust the
informant or not (Fitneva & Dunfield, 2010). Thus, the developmental differences in
Study 2 demonstrate that older children are less sensitive to expertise and more sensitive
to inaccuracy than younger children.
The Question Delegation measure in Study 2 was intended to further examine
children’s preferences and beliefs about the experts by raising the stakes and making
expertise a necessity to complete the task. Although I predicted that children would not
select the inaccurate expert to answer questions within his domain of knowledge, this was
not the case. To my surprise, children continued to prioritize expertise even after rating
the inaccurate expert as having little to no knowledge. Previous research by Boseovski et
al. (2017) found that even after children did not prioritize expertise for an endorsement
task, 6- to 8-year-olds were sensitive to expertise for the prospect of their own future
learning. It is possible that judging an expert’s knowledge for one task does not relate to
children’s need for that expertise in terms of social learning. Another possible
explanation for why children selected the inaccurate expert could be that children trust an
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informant known to be inaccurate in the absence of an alternative informant (e.g.,
Vanderbilt et al., 2014). Thus, it is possible that children did not value themselves or the
other expert as possible alternative options to answer the question correctly.
The explanations that children’s need for expertise was higher in the Question
Delegation task and that children lacked an appropriate alternative option to answer the
questions are supported by children’s justifications for why they selected the inaccurate
expert to answer some of the questions. Children often gave explanations that either
referred to the inaccurate expert having knowledge, or the control expert or themselves
not having knowledge. If the goal of social learning is to receive the best answer from the
best possible informant, children might prioritize expertise above all for future learning
(i.e., asking a new question) but not prioritize it when making overall judgments about
the individual’s knowledge. Several other explanations for why children selected the
inaccurate expert to answer the question are discussed in the General Discussion below.
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CHAPTER IV
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In a world filled with mistakes and misinformation, it is important to understand
how children think about experts who give inaccurate information. Although many
research studies have investigated children’s understanding of expertise, the current
studies are the first to investigate children’s specific judgments of an expert’s knowledge
once the expert provides inaccurate information. The studies in this dissertation addressed
this gap in the literature and investigated potential developmental differences in
children’s judgments across early elementary school.
Children’s Overall Knowledge Attributions to Experts
First, replicating previous results regarding children’s understanding of expertise
(e.g., Aguiar et al., 2012; Lutz & Keil, 2002; Shenouda & Danovitch, 2013), before being
given any information about an expert’s accuracy, children correctly attributed domain
specific knowledge to the appropriate expert about 97% of the time. This result adds to
the body of literature showing that children understand expertise and domain related
knowledge as young as 6-years-old.
Although children were accurate at attributing relevant knowledge to the relevant
expert before receiving any information about the expert’s inaccuracy, this was not the
case after hearing the four inaccurate answers. Around half of the children changed their
response regarding who knows more about the inaccurate expert’s domain of knowledge
to say that the control expert would know more. Interestingly, not all children made this
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change, suggesting that individual differences may play a role in this decision. The two
studies differed in what predicted children’s attributions (final knowledge rating in Study
1 and age in Study 2); however, there was still variability in the model that was not
predicted by these variables. These results suggest that there are other individual
differences that determine children’s choices. Previous research on the influence of
accuracy on children’s learning has found no effect of individual differences such as
theory of mind and vocabulary (Cossette et al., 2020). Future research should consider
measuring executive functioning to determine what predicts the unexplained variability in
the model. Executive functioning, specifically inhibitory control, could be a predictor of
the variability in children’s responses. Inhibitory control is the ability to maintain
attention to relevant task features and the ability to suppress or delay a dominant response
to achieve a goal (Morasch & Bell, 2011). Considering that inhibitory control improves
as children develop and older children in Study 2 were more likely to change their
knowledge attributions, it is possible that children with higher inhibitory control would
inhibit the characteristic that having the label of doctor or mechanic means that individual
has a high amount of knowledge in their relevant domains and focus on the inaccurate
information just provided. As a result, children with higher inhibitory control would
attribute knowledge to the control expert more often than children with lower inhibitory
control.
Another potential individual difference that future studies should consider is
children’s knowledge of the inaccurate expert’s domain. Previous research has
demonstrated that children rely on their own knowledge and disregard an informant’s
testimony when making decisions they are knowledgeable about (Corriveau, et al., 2009).
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Children who are more knowledgeable about bodies or cars may be more sensitive to an
expert’s inaccuracy in that domain. Future research should include measures of biological
and mechanical knowledge to determine if children’s own knowledge of the domain
influences their final knowledge attributions.
Future studies might also measure how other adults in children’s lives (i.e.,
parents and teachers) answer questions. Recent research has shown that when parents
answer difficult biological questions as if talking to their child, some parents
acknowledge their knowledge limitations (e.g., they give an explanation prefaced by “I
think” or say “I don't know”) and other parents attempt to answer the question
confidently even if their answer is not accurate (Mills et al., 2022). Children who are
exposed to adults in their own lives who admit when they do not know something may be
less sensitive to an inaccurate expert’s errors because they may be more aware that adults
do not always know everything.
Children’s Repeated Knowledge Rating of Experts
After observing the expert’s inaccuracy, children decreased their knowledge
ratings over time. This result suggests that children are sensitive to inaccuracy even when
it is weighed against expertise. As mentioned in the discussions for Study 1 and Study 2,
one explanation for why children decreased their knowledge rating of the expert over
time is because of the positivity bias. This explanation is especially relevant for Study 1
because of the significant predictor of age for children’s knowledge ratings. Research on
the positivity bias suggests that younger children are more likely than older children to
pay attention to and process information selectively to have a positive view of themselves
and/or others (see Boseovski, 2010, for a review). In addition, when given negative
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information about an individual, children need multiple pieces of evidence to then label
that individual with a negative trait (Boseovski & Lee, 2006). The results of Study 1 add
to this literature by suggesting that younger children need more negative pieces of
evidence before judging an individual negatively than older children.
Not only was the effect of age on children’s knowledge ratings examined in the current
studies, but whether the domain, or type of expert, mattered was examined as well. Study
1 did not result in a significant effect of condition and although the effect was significant
in Study 2, it was a small effect size, suggesting that the differences in knowledge ratings
between the doctor and the mechanic, while statistically significant, were small changes
with little practical significance. The current study included a doctor and a mechanic as
the experts based on evidence from previous research that children are familiar with these
experts and can recognize their domains of knowledge (i.e., Lutz & Keil, 2002). Because
these were experts within familiar domains, children could have weighed inaccuracy
equally when judging the experts’ knowledge. As mentioned previously, when children
can use their knowledge to make decisions about testimony, they disregard the
characteristics of the expert (Corriveau, et al., 2009). Future research should consider
using experts with domains of knowledge that may not have a clear correct answer to
children (e.g., art and music experts as used in Boseovski et al., 2017). Because expertise
in art domains could be considered more subjective (e.g., one expert could say a painting
is beautiful while another says it is ugly), future research should consider including
testimony that is in conflict with children’s own opinions. For example, an experimenter
could present a child with different paintings and ask them to say if the painting is pretty
or ugly. Then, when the expert provides their testimony, the expert would provide the
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opposite testimony of the child. Children could be less judgmental of an expert with
knowledge in a more subjective domain who gives incorrect answers because children
would not be as sure of the correct answer.
Children’s Explanations for Inaccurate Answers
One important aspect of the current studies is the analysis of children’s
explanations for why they believed the expert said the inaccurate answer. Children
provided informative and thoughtful explanations for why they believed the expert said
the inaccurate answer the other 73% of the time. Although I predicted that children would
provide explanations about the expert lacking knowledge, some of the other explanations
(e.g., giving excuses and endorsing the statements) were surprising.
Given previous research that demonstrates that children prefer to trust an accurate
rather than an inaccurate informant (Koenig et al., 2004; Koenig & Harris, 2005; Pasquini
et al., 2007), I did not expect any child to endorse the inaccurate answers, yet children did
so in 23% of trials in Study 1. One explanation for why children provided this
explanation could be that there was no conflicting testimony provided by an accurate or
neutral informant. Previous research has suggested that when there is no conflicting
testimony provided, children will endorse the testimony provided by a previously
inaccurate informant (Vanderbilt et al., 2014). Future research should consider having the
control expert provide an answer as well (either accurate or neutral) and measure if
children continue to endorse the inaccurate expert’s statements.
When examining children’s explanations, I was also not expecting children to
excuse the expert’s wrong answer. It is interesting to note that, by giving an excuse,
children were recognizing that the expert was wrong, but they were also expressing that it
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was ok, and that the expert should not be judged negatively for it. Previous research has
suggested that children consider excuses as a means of “self-preservation,” such that
children decrease consequences after an individual provides an excuse for their behavior
(Banerjee et al., 2010). It is possible that children in Study 1 were attempting to preserve
the expert’s status and knowledgeability by providing an excuse for the inaccurate
answer. These explanations further suggest that there may be individual differences in
how children think about experts. Specifically, although some children may be
comfortable making a negative judgment, others take expertise into consideration and try
to provide explanations that maintain the expert’s credibility.
One reason why children’s overall knowledge attributions to experts and
children’s repeated knowledge rating of experts show different patterns of judgments
involves children’s evaluations of trait and state characteristics. Personality psychology
research has long proposed an interaction between trait characteristics (i.e.,
characteristics that generalize across situations) and state characteristics (i.e.,
characteristics that are dependent on the situation at a specific moment; Schmitt & Blum,
2020). Some children may have viewed the overall knowledge attribution as a trait
judgment while viewing the knowledge rating as a state judgment. Children’s
explanations support this possibility because some children provided explanations that
were general trait attributions while others provided explanations focused on the
statement provided.
If I were to repeat this study, I would consider changing the forced-choice options
given to children to better understand their explanations in Study 2. As noted in Study 1,
there are two general categories of explanations: Expert Focused and Statement Focused.

71

Although Study 2 used the two most frequently produced subcategories of those
explanations that were also predictive of children’s knowledge ratings, it could be
insightful to give the broader categories as the forced-choice options. It is possible that
children believe the expert said the inaccurate answer due to a reason concerning him
(e.g., he does not know anything or learned the answer wrong) or due to a reason
concerning the answer given (e.g., that answer is right or wrong). The current study did
not include these options because I believed they would be too abstract for children to
understand (e.g., “Why do you think the doctor said a person does not have any bones in
their hands? Is it because of him or the question that was asked?”). Because children
might need assistance in understanding more abstract questions like these, future research
could include a practice or training section on what the question means, or an explanation
that “Sometimes people answer questions wrong. Sometimes they are wrong because of
something to do with the person, such as they are not smart or forgot the answer. Other
times they say the wrong answer because of the question asked, such as the question was
too hard, or the question did not make sense.” Given enough training and support,
children should be better able to answer the question and further our understanding for
why children think experts provide inaccurate answers.
Children’s Reliance on Expertise Regardless of Inaccuracy
In Study 2, children not only judged the expert’s knowledge and indicated who
knew more about the domain, but they were also tasked with a game where an expert’s
assistance would be helpful to win. Interestingly, although 91% of children rated the
expert as having little to no knowledge by the final trial (i.e., a final knowledge rating of
1 or 2) and 56% of children said that the control expert knew more about the inaccurate
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expert’s domain of expertise, children chose the inaccurate expert to answer questions
within his relevant domain of knowledge 77% of the time during the game task.
Children may have weighed their options and decided that the inaccurate expert
was the best informant to answer their questions, even after rating him as having little to
no knowledge. One explanation for this decision is that the expert provided inaccurate
answers confidently. Previous research has shown that children prefer to learn from a
confident speaker over a hesitant one (Brosseau-Liard et al., 2014). However, BrosseauLiard et al. also demonstrated that when given the choice between an inaccurate confident
speaker and an accurate hesitant speaker, children prefer to learn from the accurate
hesitant speaker. It is possible that because the control expert never provided information,
children could not gauge his confidence or accuracy, therefore they simply relied on the
inaccurate expert’s confidence to guide their choices.
Another explanation for why children selected the inaccurate expert to answer the
questions could be that, during middle childhood, children begin to grasp the nuances of
expertise, including the difference between more sophisticated “specialist” knowledge
and “generalist” knowledge (Landrum & Mills, 2015). It is possible that by age 6
children recognize that a doctor might know some things about the body but not others.
Children’s justifications further support this possibility, such that children were likely to
say the reason they selected the inaccurate expert to answer the question was because the
question was about the specific domain of expertise. Although the questions were
intended to be similar to the inaccuracy trial questions, children could have judged the
questions as a different set of specific knowledge and therefore believed that the
inaccurate expert could still answer them.
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A third explanation for why children selected the inaccurate expert is because
assigning the question to the confident but inaccurate informant allows them to distance
themselves from being at fault for not answering correctly. Previous research with adults
suggests that when on a team, an adult will assign trivia questions to be answered by
somebody else because if the question is answered incorrectly, it was not “their fault”
because they did not produce the answer themselves (Fisher & Oppenheimer, 2021).
Also, research with children shows that by age 6 children recognize when they do not
know answers and then children will assign test questions correctly to experts (Aguiar et.
al., 2012). Children’s justifications for why they picked the inaccurate expert to answer
the questions also support this explanation, such that some children (26%) said they
would not know the answers to the questions. It is possible a younger age group would
have shown a larger self-bias; therefore, future research should consider including
younger children when measuring children’s judgments of inaccurate experts.
Although these explanations provide insight as to why children selected the
inaccurate expert or did not select themselves to answer questions, these explanations fail
to explain why children did not select the control expert who provided no inaccurate
answers. One reason they might have not selected the control expert was because the
control expert never provided an answer to the other questions. Previous research has
shown that children younger than 9-years-old believe experts who provide impossible
answers to impossible questions (e.g., question: “‘If you count all the leaves on all trees
in the entire world, how many will you get?”; answer: “There are exactly
809,343,573,353,235 leaves on all trees in the world”) are better experts than experts who
admits to not knowing the answer (e.g., “I don’t know because it is not possible to answer
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that question precisely”; Kominksy et al., 2016). In Study 2, the inaccurate expert
provided an answer to all the questions, although the answers were inaccurate. Children
may have believed an answer that may be inaccurate is better than no answer at all.
Children’s justifications for why they selected the inaccurate expert to answer the
questions supports this explanation, such that 21% of children’s justifications referenced
that the control expert would not have known the answer, therefore they took the chance
that the inaccurate expert would provide an answer rather than the chance the control
expert would answer “I don’t know” to the question.
Methodological Limitations
It is important to note that the current studies contain a few methodological
limitations that future studies should attempt to address. One limitation is that, in the
current studies, both experts were represented by images of white males. Future research
should examine whether the experts’ physical characteristics influence children’s
judgments of their expertise. Based on previous research that demonstrates that children
attribute knowledge/brilliance to white men more than white women, and more than to
both men and women of color (Jaxon et al., 2019), I did not want race or gender to bias
children’s perceptions of the experts before any introduction of inaccuracy. However,
given previous research on the influence of race and gender on children’s judgment of
informants’ knowledge, it is likely that children would judge a white male doctor
differently than a white female doctor or a doctor of color when both give inaccurate
information. Future research should consider attempting to replicate the finding of Study
1 and Study 2 with experts that are representative of individuals with minority/diverse
identities.
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Along the same lines as examining the influence of the experts’ identities, future
research should also gather data from a more diverse sample of children. Another
limitation of the current studies was that all data in the current sample were collected
from WEIRD populations (i.e., western, educated, industrialized, rich and democratic;
Henrich et al., 2010). Members of WEIRD populations, including young children, do not
necessarily represent all humans, yet most psychological research involves WEIRD
participants (Henrich et al., 2010). Future research should consider replicating the current
studies with samples that are inclusive of more diverse populations. Because the “E” in
WEIRD stands for “educated”, it is possible that children from non-WEIRD populations
may respond differently to the current tasks because the pursuit of formal education is
less common in these societies. It is possible that the label of expert in non-WEIRD
populations does not hold the same epistemic meaning as it does in WEIRD populations.
For example, a formally educated doctor may not exist in some societies, however there
may be a tribal herbalist that has acquired their expertise through knowledge passed
down over generations. Because knowledgeability may be treated differently in these
populations, it would be important to replicate the current findings with non-WEIRD
populations.
Another factor that could change the results between populations is different
societal rules for respecting authority figures. In some societies, children may be raised to
always respect authority (e.g., a doctor) and to never judge them in any negative way. In
the current studies, this would be important to children’s knowledge ratings and
explanations, such that children in societies that value respect of authority may have
children that do not give low knowledge ratings and do not provide explanations

76

containing negative traits. Previous research in a WEIRD population has found that
parents who score higher on authoritarianism (i.e., encouraging children to be obedient
and respect authority) are less likely to admit when they do not know something than
parents who score low on authoritarianism (Mills et. al., 2022). It is possible that children
belonging to societies with more authoritarian values would continue to rate the expert as
knowledgeable, even after viewing examples of inaccuracy, because they have been
raised to respect authority and they have not been exposed to authority figures (e.g.,
parents) who model uncertainty or how to handle not always knowing the answers.
Conclusions
The studies presented here suggest that children weigh accuracy and expertise
differently depending on the task at hand. Importantly, even within those tasks, there are
individual differences between children in whether they prioritize an informant’s
accuracy or expertise. When attributing overall knowledge to an expert after the expert
provides inaccurate information, children seem to be split on whether they continue to
attribute knowledge to the inaccurate expert or not. Individual differences may play a key
role in why some children make this change and not others. When judging an expert’s
amount of knowledge immediately following an inaccurate answer, children seem to
weigh the expert’s inaccuracy more than the label of expert. Finally, when faced with a
new task where expertise would be helpful, children seem to weigh an expert’s prior
inaccuracy less than they did when simply rating knowledge. Thus, the results of the
current studies suggest that children weigh expertise and inaccuracy differently
depending on the task at hand.
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Having a better understanding of children’s judgments and beliefs about
inaccurate experts allows educators, policy makers, and caregivers to better interact with
children when discussing or explaining misinformation. As noted in the studies presented
here, even if children think experts know everything, they are sensitive to inaccurate
answers. It is important for parents and people who work closely with children (e.g.,
doctors, teachers, and coaches) to take note when they provide an inaccurate answer
because the children are taking note themselves. These individuals should give
explanations for why they might have provided the wrong answer and explain that just
because someone gives a wrong answer, that does not mean that they lose their
credibility. In cases where children are repeatedly given wrong answers (e.g., fake news
on television), it is important for parents and educators to discuss that the label of expert
(e.g., doctor) does not always mean that a person is the best informant. Parents and
educators should explain that there are people who may have the label of expert (e.g., Dr.
Oz) but they may not always provide the best information (e.g., providing non-scientific
advice and supporting unproven products on a television show). Children should be
encouraged to listen and think critically about the answers provided by experts before
deciding whether they should consider the expert as the best source for future
information.
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APPENDIX A
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APPENDIX B

Doctor

Question
How many bones are in a
person’s hand?
Which body part do people use to
kick?
What is used to fix a broken arm?

Which body part do people use to
see?
Mechanic How many wheels does a car
have?
Which part of a car helps it move
side to side?
What is used to fix a flat tire?
Which part of a car is used to turn
the car?

92

Answer
A person doesn’t have any bones in
their hand
People kick with their ears
Blue paint is used to fix a broken arm
People see with their stomachs
A car does not have any wheels
Cars have skis that move them side to
side
Tooth paste is used to fix a flat tire
Seatbelts are used to turn the car

APPENDIX C

“1 star means a person does not know anything, 2 stars means they know almost nothing,
3 stars means they know a little bit, 4 stars means they know some things, 5 stars means
they know a lot of things, 6 stars means they know most things, and 7 stars means they
know more than anybody else.”
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APPENDIX D
Question
Biological

What is used to fix a broken tooth?
How many eyelashes are on a person’s eye?
Which part of the body grows the fastest?
How many ounces of blood are in a person’s body?
What is used to look in a person’s ear?
TOTAL
Mechanical What is used to fix a broken car window?
How many pipes are in a car’s engine?
Which part of a car turns gas into energy?
How many parts of a car are made of copper?
What is used to clean a car’s engine?
TOTAL
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Mean

SD

4.00
5.00
4.00
4.75
4.00
4.35
4.25
5.00
3.88
4.50
4.00
4.33

1.07
0.00
1.31
0.46
0.76
0.92
1.04
0.00
1.46
1.07
0.54
1.00
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